| Two Models of the Criminal Process by HERBERT L. PACKER
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| Saturday, November 8, 2008 |
| Press Release Elsam : Putusan MK tentang Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati, Terjebak Positivisme Hukum Formal |
Press Release
No : 05/DP/Elsam/X/08
Putusan MK tentang Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati:
Terjebak Positivisme Hukum Formal
Dalam putusan yang dibacakan majelis hakim konstitusi yang dipimpin Mahfud MD dalam
sidang di Mahkamah Konstitusi, Jakarta, Selasa 21 Oktober 2008, Mahkamah Konstitusi
menolak permohonan Amrozi, Muklas, dan Imam Samudra yang mempersoalkan hukuman mati
dengan cara ditembak. Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) menegaskan tidak ada satu cara pun yang
menjamin tiadanya rasa sakit dalam pelaksanaan pidana mati. Semua mengandung risiko
terjadinya ketidaktepatan yang menimbulkan rasa sakit.
Dalam Putusannya, MK menegaskan bahwa tata cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati di Indonesia
adalah menurut UU No.2/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati yang
merupakan lex specialis yang menegasikan pasal 11 KUHAP. Lebih lanjut, MK menyatakan UU
No. 2/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelakasaan Hukuman Mati yang dijatuhkan oleh
Pengadilan di Lingkungan Peradilan Umum dan Militer tidak bertentangan dengan Pasal 28I
ayat (1) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.
Di tengah pro-kontra wacana terhadap hukuman mati di Indonesia, prinsip dasar atas
penghormatan fundamental terhadap HAM semestinya menjadi pijakan utama. Hak untuk hidup
(right to life); merupakan kategori hak yang tidak bisa dilanggar, dikurangi serta
dibatasi dalam keadaan apapun, termasuk dalam batasan regulasi formal. Apalagi, hal ini
secara jelas tercantum dalam Konstitusi RI. Mahkamah Konstitusi, sebagai pengawal
pelaksanaan UUD 1945, seharusnya menjalankan amanat konstitusi tersebut dengan
memberikan amanat penghapusan hukuman mati. Terlebih dalam sistem hukum di Indonesia,
hukuman mati bukanlah cara yang efektif untuk menghentikan suatu tindak pidana. Sistem
peradilan kita masih belum dapat menjamin sebuah proses yang jujur (fair trial),
sehingga kemungkinan terjadinya peradilan sesat khususnya kesalahan penerapan hukum
cukup besar akibat korupsi, birokratisasi, diskriminasi dan bias kelas. Dalam konteks
itu, kehadiran sanksi hukuman mati tentu tidak dapat memperbaiki satu keputusan hakim
yang salah. Di sisi lain, tidak ada pembuktian akademis bahwa pelaksanaan hukuman mati
secara efektif memberikan efek jera kepada pelaku kejahatan dan mengurangi tindak pidana
yang terjadi.
Putusan MK yang melihat bahwa pelaksanaan hukuman mati tidak bertentangan dengan Pasal
28I ayat (1) UUD 1945 karena menganggap tata cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati berdasarkan
UU No.2/Pnps/1964 bukan merupakan tindakan penyiksaan adalah sebuah keputusan yang
terjebak positivisme hukum formal, karena hanya melihat unsur yang digugat saja, yaitu
penyiksaan. Padahal, Pasal 28I ayat (1) UUD 1945 secara tegas dan jelas mengatur
mengenai hak-hak dasar warga negara sebagai satu kesatuan yang utuh, di mana dengan
tegas dinyatakan bahwa hak untuk hidup merupakan hak dasar yang harus dijamin oleh
negara.
Putusan MK ini secara nyata telah mengabaikan perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan hukum dan
peraturan perundang-undangan di Indonesia yang telah mengalami perubahan paradigma
sebagaimana terlihat dalam RUU KUHP yang sudah menempatkan hukuman mati sebagai pidana
yang bersifat khusus dan diancamkan secara alternatif. Pidana mati dapat dijatuhkan
secara bersyarat, dengan memberikan masa percobaan, sehingga dalam tenggang waktu masa
percobaan tersebut terpidana diharapkan dapat memperbaiki diri sehingga pidana mati
tidak perlu dilaksanakan. Demikian juga dengan Statuta Roma Mahkamah Pidana
Internasional (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998) yang rencananya
akan diratifikasi Pemerintah Indonesia pada tahun 2008 ini, yang sama sekali tidak
mengatur mengenai ancaman pidana mati. Hukuman dalam mekanisme International Criminal
Court juga hanya berupa hukuman penjara yang terdiri dari hukuman penjara seumur hidup
untuk kejahatan yang sangat serius dan hukuman penjara maksimum 30 tahun.
Disamping itu, penerapan hukuman mati bertentangan dengan ketentuan hukum hak asasi
manusia Internasional yang secara tegas menyatakan hukuman mati bertentangan dengan
prinsip-prinsip yang diatur di dalam konvenan Internasional Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik
(International in Civil and Political Rigts-ICCPR.). Hak untuk hidup (rights to life)
–yaitu pada bagian III Pasal 6 (1) –menyatakan bahwa setiap manusia berhak atas hak
untuk hidup dan mendapatkan perlindungan hukum dan tiada yang dapat mencabut hak itu.
Perlu diingat bahwa prinsip-prinsip yang diatur dalam ICCPR telah menjadi bagian dari
hukum nasional Indonesia, melalui UU No.12 Tahun 2005 tentang Ratifikasi Kovenan Hak-hak
Sipil dan Politik.
Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi ini sangatlah ironi, mengingat dasar filosofis dan
konstitusi negara Indonesia yang kemudian dikonkritkan lagi dalam Ketetapan MPR Nomor
XVII/MPR/1998 telah secara eksplisit menyebutkan bahwa pandangan dan sikap bangsa
Indonesia mengenai hak asasi manusia adalah bersumber dari ajaran agama, nilai moral
universal, dan nilai luhur budaya bangsa, serta berdasarkan Pancasila, dimana hak asasi
manusia adalah hak dasar yang melekat pada diri manusia yang sifatnya kodrati dan
universal sebagai karunia Tuhan Yang Maha Esa dan berfungsi untuk menjamin kelangsungan
hidup, kemerdekaan, perkembangan manusia dan masyarakat, yang tidak boleh diabaikan,
dirampas atau diganggu gugat oleh siapa pun.
Oleh karenanya, mempertahankan penerapan hukuman mati dalam pendekatan hukum positif
semata jelas tidak dapat dipertanggungjawabkan. Dalam kondisi demikian, perubahan
terhadap hukum nasional menuju penghapusan hukuman mati menjadi sebuah keharusan.
Terlebih lagi konstitusi negara telah melahirkan pengakuan akan hak untuk hidup yang
tidak dapat dikurangi atas alasan apapun, sehingga penghapusan hukuman mati diseluruh
ketentuan hukum adalah kewajiban konstitusional.
Jakarta, 24 Oktober 2008
Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM)
Indriaswaty Dyah Saptaningrung, S.H, LLM
Asisten Deputi Direktur Program
Kontak : Indriaswaty DS (0813 80305 728)
src="http://www.feedm8.com/web/js/smswidget.js">
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posted by Jodi Santoso @ 4:11 AM 
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| Wednesday, June 18, 2008 |
| Pergeseran Makna Terorisme |
M Jodi Santoso
Dalam mengkaji terorisme, satu hal yang perlu diingat adalah adanya perbedaan sudut pandang tentang terorisme. Lebih dari itu, terorisme hingga saat ini menjadi sebuah gejala sosial yang kompleks. Sudut pandang dan kepentingan para pihak larut dalam memaknai terorisme. Pemaknaan dari sudut pandang yang berbeda tersebut yang menyebabkan terjadinya pergeseran makna terorisme dari masa kemasa. Terorisme pada awal kemunculannya berkonotasi positif, kini menjadi sebuah kejahatan berat dan kejahatan terhadap kemanusian (crime againt humanity).
Istilah teror (isme), pertama kali, populer pada masa Revolusi Perancis (1789-1794). Akan tetapi, praktik terorisme itu sendiri terjadi jauh sebelumnya. Dalam catatan sejarah, terorisme telah dipraktikkan manusia sejak zaman Yunani kuno. Xenophon (431-350 SM) misalnya, menuliskan dalam bukunya tentang terorisme dalam term "perang psikologis" untuk menaklukkan musuh. Pada awal abad masehi tercatat nama Kaisar Rome Tiberius (14-37) dan Caligula (37-41) yang melakukan terorisme terhadap lawan-lawan politiknya.
Aksi teror juga dilakukan Zealot (hidup pada 66-73 M), sebuah organisasi partai politik yang beroposisi dengan pemerintahan Herodes yang menentang penjajah Roma. Mereka menuntut kemurnian religius dan menentang segala tindakan asusila dan tindakan yang bersifat anti Yahudi. Mereka menggunakan pisau kecil yang disebut sica yang disembunyikan di balik jaket. Dengan senjata sica tersebut, aksi Zealot sering disebut Sicarii. Aksi sicarri dilakukan dengan cara bercampur orang-orang dipasar. Jika mereka melihat suatu pelanggaran mereka langsung mengambil pisau dan menikam si pelanggar. Metode yang mereka gunakan adalah praktek pembunuhan teroganisir di zaman kuno. Tindakan ini bersifat acak dan menimbulkan ketakutan masyarakat. Motivasi kelompok Zealot adalah agama dan didukung oleh kitab suci.
Teror sebagai sebuah aksi yang sistematis dikenal sejak Revolusi Perancis (1789-1794). Pada masa itu, muncul apa yang dikenal dengan French Revolution’s terrorism atau regime de la terreur pimpinan Maximilien Robespierre. Regime de la terreur digunakan sebagai instrumen untuk mendirikan Revolusionary State yaitu membentuk sebuah masyarakat baru yang lebih baik. Selain mempunyai kaitan erat dengan revolusi, Maximilien Robespierre, sang pemimpin gerakan, mengaitkan teror dengan kebaikan (virtue) dan demokrasi (democracy). Robespierre menyebutkan : virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless. … terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; its therefore an emanation of virtue.
Terdapat dua karakteristik utama dari French Revolution’s terrorism. Pertama, regime de la terreur tidak dilakukan dengan acak random dan tidak juga indiskriminasi (neither random nor indiscriminate), tetapi dilakukan secara terorganisir (organized), terarah dan berhati-hati (deliberate), serta sistematis (systematic). Karakteristik ini yang membedakan regime de la terreur dengan aksi terror yang digambarkan saat ini. Kedua, tujuan French Revolution’s terrorism (regime de la terreur) adalah untuk membentuk sebuah masyarakat baru yang lebih baik (a new and batter society).
Pertengahan abad ke-19, di Eropa, revolusi Perancis mengilhami munculnya sentimentil anti monarki (anti penguasa). Pada abad ini, muncul aksi era terorisme baru di mana terorisme dikonotasikan dengan gerakan anti pemerintahan. Aksi-aksi teror digunakan sebagai taktik untuk menggulingkan orang-orang berkuasa. Carlo Pisacane, seorang extrim Republika Italia, melakukan gerakan revolusioner yang disandarkan pada teori “the propaganda by deed”.
Hingga menjelang perang dunia I, terrorisme berkonotasi revolutioner. Bersamaan dengan perang dunia II dan semangat pergerakan kemerdekaan, penggunaan istilah teorisme digunakan dalam perspektif berbeda. Pertama, teroris dikonotasikan dengan gerakan revolusioner. Dan, kedua, mengacu pada pemberontakan yang dilakukan kaum nasionalis/anti-colonialis. Konotasi kedua memicu ketidaksenangan para pejuang kemerdekaan (negara dunia ketiga) dengan stigma teroris. mereka dengan tegas menolak stigma teroris yang melekat pada mereka. Bagi mereka (pejuang kemerdekaan) berjuang untuk kemerdekaan dan kebebasan demi tanah air dari penjajahan bukan terorisme tetapi freedom fighters.
Pada awal tahun 1990, muncul istilah narco terrorism dan istilah gray area phenomenon. Istilah Pertama muncul bersamaan dengan gerakan sekelompok orang dengan motivasi ekonomi yang bergelut dalam peragangan obat terlarang. Narco terrorism muncul akibat pertemuan antara penjualan obat terlarang dengan penjualan senjata. Sedangkan istilah gray area phenomenon digunakan pada gerakan yang mengancam stabilitas nasional oleh orang atau kelompol bukan negara.
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| posted by Jodi Santoso @ 8:21 PM
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| Terorisme dalam sistem peradilan pidana |
M Jodi Santoso
Sumber : Harian Tempo, 27 Oktober 2003
Dua tahun masa war of terrorism yang dimotori Amerika Serikat masih belum menyentuh akar pemasalahan. Yang tersisa kini kedukaan para keluarga korban dan ketidakpuasan masyarakat terhadap penanganan tindak pidana terorisme. Menolak terorisme adalah wajib tetapii menyelesaikan akar permasalahan merupakan kunci utama dari sikap penolakan terhadap terorisme. Amerika Serikat hanya mengejar pelaku teror tetapi belum pernah memberi jawaban secara resmi dan lengkap terhadap tuntutan dan motivasi para teroris (baca Osama bin Laden dkk.). Mengurai, mengidentifikasi, dan menyelesaikan akar permasalahan merupakan sikap penolakan terhadap terorisme yang paling penting untuk mencegah terjadinya terorisme di masa mendatang. Terorisme bukan problem lokal tetapi problem internaional, Playground-nya berskala international. Terorisme dapat terjadi dimana saja, kapan saja dan targetnya pun siapa saja.( Ong Yen Nee, 2002). Terorisme bukan problem Amerika semata tatapi manjadi masalah seluruh umat manusia.
Dalam sistem peradilan pidana internasional, tindak pidana teroris manjadi materi diskusi yang cukup menarik. Hampir semua ahli hukum pidana dan kriminolog mengatakan bahwa tindak pidana terorisme merupakan extraordinary crime dan proses peradilannya pun berbeda dengan tindak pidana biasa. Karena sifatnya yang extraordinary crime inilah hampir semua negara mengunakan undang-undang khusus dalam menanggulangi tindak pidan terorisme. Akan tetapi, Kent Roach (Canada), Adnan Buyung Nasution dan beberapa ahli hukum pidana dan HAM (antara lain, Koalisi Untuk Keselamatan Masyarakat Sipil) menolak pandangan demikian. Bagii mereka, terorisme merupakan tindak pidana biasa dan penangganannyapun cukup dengan aturan perundang-undang yang berlaku bagi tindak pidana lainnya. Dalam kontek sistem peradilan pidana cukup dengan ketentuan KUHP dan KUHAP saja tidak perlu menggunakan UU Antiteroris atau yang lainnya seperti ISA (Internal scurity act).
Namun demikian, tidak dapat disanggah bahwa tindak pidana terorisme dapat dikategorikan sebagia mala per se bukan termasuk mala prohibita. Hal ini karena terorisme merupakan crime against concience, menjadi jahat bukan karena dilarang oleh undang-undang tetapi karena pada dasarnya terorisme merupakan tindakan tercela.(Muladi,2002).
Walaupun terorisme dianggap sebagai extraordinary crime dan crime against humanity, terorisme bukan merupakan tindak pidana dalam yuridiksi International Criminal Court (ICC). Amerika Serikat dengan tegas menolak usulan beberapa negara yang menghendaki tindak pidana terorisme sebagai tindak pidana yang berada dalam yurisdiksi ICC. Dengan tidak masuknya terorisme maka menurut Art. 5 Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court (Statuta Roma Tentang Mahkamah Pidana Internasional) hanya empat tindak pidana yang dianggap sebagai tindak pidana paling serius, yaitu : (1) genocida; (2) tindak pidana terhadap kemanusian; (3) tindak pidana perang; dan (4) agresi. Sampai sekarang, Amerika Serikat belum menandatangani International criminal court (ICC). Pada hal dukungan Amerika Serikat sangat dibutuhkan dalam upaya dunia internasional untuk segera pembentukan Mahkamah Pidana Internasional. Di sinilah mulai muncul anggapan negatif atas ambivalensi Amerika Serikat dalam upaya penanganan terorisme. Pada sisi lain Amerika Serikat menolak terorisme masuk dalam yuridiksi ICC dan sampai sekarang belum menandatangai ICC pda sisi lain Amerika Serikat, melalui pernyataan resmi George W. Bush tanggal 11 Oktober 2001, terorisme sebagai Sebuah Serangan Terhadap Peradaban Dunia..
Ambivalensi sikap Amerika juga tercermin dalam law enforcement. Amerika Serikat telah melanggar prinsip-prinsip perlindungan HAM dalam criminal justice process terhadap pelaku terorisme. Sikap ini berbeda dengan upaya perlindungan HAM dalam administrasi peradilan pidana (protection of human right in criminal justice administration) di mana Amerika Serikat sebagai pendukung utamanya. Bahkan konsep perlindungan HAM dalam sistem peradilan Pidana (criminal Justice system) yang berkembang di Amerika Serikat telah menjadi kiblat bagi negara-negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, administrasi peradilan pidana yang telah dibangun selama berabad-abad tersebut sama sekali tidak berlaku bagi pelaku tindak pidana terorisme. Amerika Serikat telah berhasil membangun sistem peradilan pidana yang kondusif bagi perlindungan tersangka pelaku tindak pidana di negaranya tetapi gagal mengembangankan sistem peradilan pidana internasional.
Catatan terpenting yang dapat dicermati selama dua tahun masa war of terrorism adalah Amerika Serikat telah memutar “jarum jam” administrasi peradilan pidana. Kebijakan politik luar negeri Amerika Serikat telah menghancurkan bangunan konsep dan praktik peradilan pidana yang memberikan perlindungan hak tersangka yang dibangun sejak berabad-abad tahun yang lalu. Amerika Serikat telah membawa kembali dunia peradilan pidana ke abad 13 di mana metode yang digunakan dalam administrasi peradilan pidana adalah iquisitorial method ketika pertama kali muncul dalam sejarah peradilan pidana.
Karakteristik penyelesaian perkara pidana berdasarkan sistem model iquisitorial seperti antara lain : dilakukan secara rahasia, tersangka pelaku tindak pidana ditempatkan terasing dan tidak diperkenankan berkomunikasi dengan puhak lain termasuk keluarga, Pemeriksaan saksi terpisah. Tujuan pemeriksaan waktu itu adalah untuk memperoleh pengakuan (confession) dari tersangka. Apabila tersangka tidak mau secara sukarela mengakui perbuatannya atau kesalahannya maka petugas pemeriksa akan memperpanjang penderitaan tersangka melalui cara penyiksaan (toture) sampai diperoleh pengakuan. Tertuduh tidak berhak didampingi pembela, tidak ada perlindungan dan jaminan hak asasi. Karakteristik yang demikian sebenarnya telah lama ditinggalkan. Akan tetapi, Amerika dalam penanganan tindak pidana terorisme telah mengangkat kembali administrasi peradilan pidana yang demikian dalam penangganan tindal pidana terorisme. Penahanan para tersangaka di Guntanamo, proses penyidikan yang rahasia, dan menghilangkan hak-hak dasar seorang tersangka lainnya telah dihilangkan.
Dalam Konteks ke Indonesiaan
UU Antiterorisme memberikan kewenangan hakim dalam proses pra-ajudikasi (Pasal 26 ayat (2) dan penjelasan umum). Untuk melindungi hak-hak tersangka pelaku tindak pidana terorisme dan untuk auditing terhadap laporan intelijen telah dibentuk lembaga baru yang bernama “Hearing”. Akan tetapi, bagaimana bentuk dan mekanisme bekerjanya lembaga baru tersebut sampai sekarang “belum jelas”. Sehingga bukan hal yang aneh apabila di Solo, Ketua Pengadilan Negeri Solo menganggap penangkapan terhadap tersangka pelaku tindak pidana terorisme tidak prosedural. (Tempo, Rabu, 17 september 2002). Pernyataan tersebut mengindikasikan belum berjalannya integrated administration of criminal justice menurut Undang-Undang Antiteroris.
Pasal 26 ayat (2) Perpu Antiterorisme menyebutkan bahwa “ Penetapan bahwa sudah dapat atau diperoleh bukti permulaan yang cukup sebagaimana dimaksud dalam ayat (1) harus dilakukan proses pemeriksaan oleh Ketua atau Wakil Ketua Pengadilan Negeri. Sedangkan dalam ayat (4) di jelaskan bahwa : “Jika dalam pemeriksaan sebagaimana dimaksud dalam ayat (2) ditetapkan adanya bukti permulaan yang cukup, maka Ketua Pengadilan Negeri segera memerintahkan dilaksanakan penyidikan.” Ketentuan Pasal 26 tersebut di atas dengan jelas memberikan kewenangan kepada Pengadilan dalam hal ini Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Pengadilan Negeri dalam proses pra-ajudikasi (proses peradilan sebelum sidang pengadilan). Akan tetapi keterlibatan pengadilan tersebur hanya sebatas pada pemerikasaan terhadap informasi intelijen (pasal 26 ayat (1) dan (2)).
Dalam pasal 26 ayat (1) disebutkan bahwa: “(1) Untuk memperoleh bukti permulaan yang cukup, penyidik dapat menggunakan setiap laporan intelijen.” Politik hukum pidana dengan menggunakan istilah “dapat menggunakan” dalam ayat (1) tersebut memberikan kemungkinan kepada Kepolisian menggunakan sumber, data, atau laporan lain untuk digunakan sebagai bukti awal yan kuat untuk menduga dan/atau melakukan penangkapan dan penahanan terhadap tersangka tindak pidana terorisme. Konsekuensi logis yang mungkin timbul dalam masalah tersebut adalah “pengingkaran” sumber informasi apabila terdapat gugatan praperadilan darii tersangka, keluarga, atau penasihat hukumnya.
Sisi lain dari UU Antiterorisme adalah pemberian kewenangan yang sangat besar kepada aparat penegak hukum dalam administrasi peradilan pidana. Pengungkapan fakta secara efisien a la Crime Control Model-nya Herbert L. Packer tercermin dalam proses peradilan pidana terhadap tindak pidana terorisme. Sedangkan kebijakan hukum pidana yang dilakukan oleh DPR (dan Pemerintah) dalam UU antiterorisme mengingatkan kita pada analisis Kent Roach bahwa due process can be for Crime control.(Kent Roach, 1919651: 21)
Mungkinkah dengan lembaga “Hearing”, Indonesia mampu mempertahankan prinsip due process of law dalam sistem peradilan pidana. Atau lembaga ini sengaja dibentuk untuk melegitimasi laporan intelijen dan pada gilirannya mengikuti langkah Amerika Serikat untuk membawa kembali sistem peradilan pidana ke abad ke-13 dengan model Inquisitoril yang menindas. Quo Vadis sistem peradilan pidana?
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| posted by Jodi Santoso @ 1:37 AM
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| Monday, August 6, 2007 |
| Statement of THE SECRETARY-GENERAL |
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESS ON THE LAUNCH OF
UNITING AGAINST TERRORISM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A GLOBAL
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY
New York, 2 May 2006
Mr. President,
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,
I deeply regret that last week, in the 5th Committee, Member States were unable to reach consensus on the proposals I had put before you for management reform. In spite of this, I am convinced that all Member States remain committed to reform in principle, and I urge you to work together to rebuild the spirit of mutual trust that is essential to the smooth functioning of this Organization.
I am, as always, ready to help you in your continued search for agreement on ways to pursue the agenda set out in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. In particular, you will recall that in that Document, your Heads of State and Government asked me to “submit proposals to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and enhance coordination of United Nations activities in this regard”. And you will recall that they also urged you to develop without delay the elements I had identified, “with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international level, to counter terrorism”.
Today, I have the privilege of presenting to you my vision on that matter, contained in the document Uniting against terrorism: Recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy.
These recommendations stem from a fundamental conviction which we all share: that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, is unacceptable and can never be justified.
Uniting around that conviction is the basis for what I hope will be a collective global effort to fight terrorism -- an effort bringing together Governments, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector -- each using their comparative advantage to supplement the others’ efforts.
In formulating my recommendations, I have built further on the “five Ds”-- the fundamental components which I first outlined in Madrid last year. They are:
* dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it;
* denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack;
* deterring States from supporting terrorism;
* developing State capacity to defeat terrorism, and;
* defending human rights.
I believe all five are interlinked conditions crucial to the success of any strategy against terrorism. To succed, we sill need to make progress on all these fronts.
Implementing a global strategy requires us to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it, by driving a wedge between terrorists and their potential constituencies. We need to launch a global campaign of Governments, the UN, civil society and the private sector, with the message that terrorism is unacceptable in any form, and that there are far better and more effective ways for those with genuine grievances to seek redress. One of the clearest and most powerful ways we can do that is by refocusing our attention on the victims. It is high time we took serious and concerted steps to build international solidarity with them, respecting their dignity as well as expressing our compassion.
 Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack means denying them access both to conventional weapons and to weapons of mass destruction. That will require innovative thinking from all of us about today’s threats -- including those which States cannot address by themselves, such as bioterrorism. Similarly, it will mean working together to counter terrorists’ growing use of the Internet. We must find ways to make sure that this powerful tool becomes a weapon in our hands, not in theirs.
Our work in deterring States from supporting terrorism must be rooted firmly in the international rule of law -- creating a solid legal basis for common actions, and holding States accountable for their performance in meeting their obligations. This work is intimately linked with the need to develop State capacity to defeat terrorism.
In response to a request I received last December from the President of this Assembly, the document I am presenting today elaborates on steps to build state capacity, and to strengthen the Organization’s work in this field. The UN system has a vital contribution to make in all the relevant areas -- from promoting the rule of law and effective criminal justice systems to ensuring countries have the means to counter the financing of terrorism; from strengthening capacity to prevent nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, to improving the ability of countries to provide assistance and support for victims and their families.
Finally, defending human rights runs like a scarlet thread through the report. It is a prerequisite to every aspect of any effective counter-terrorism strategy. It is the bond that brings the different components together. That means the human rights of all -- of the victims of terrorism, of those suspected of terrorism, of those affected by the consequences of terrorism.
States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. Any strategy that compromises human rights will play right into the hands of the terrorists.
My dear friends,
All States, in every region -- large or small, strong or weak -- are vulnerable to terrorism and its consequences. They all stand to benefit from a strategy to counter it. They all have a role to play in shaping such a strategy, in implementing it, and in ensuring that it is updated continuously to respond to challenges as they evolve.
It is also essential that Member States conclude, as soon as possible, a Comprehensive Convention on International terrorism. However, lack of progress in building consensus on a Convention cannot be a reason for delay in agreeing on a strategy.
By instructing you to adopt and implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, your Heads of State and Government have given you a momentous challenge, and a historic opportunity.
By rising to that challenge, you will demonstrate the resolve of the international community, and lay the foundations of a truly global response to this vicious global scourge. I hope my recommendations will help you in that vital mission.
Thank you very much.
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| posted by Jodi Santoso @ 2:43 AM
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| Thursday, June 28, 2007 |
| Two Models of the Criminal Process ( I I) |
by
HERBERT L. PACKER
Reprinted and published by http://www.hhs.csus.edu
from The Limits of the Criminal Sanction by Herbert L. Packer, with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press. 1968 by Herbert L. Packer.
In one of the most important contributions to systematic thought about the administration of criminal justice, Herbert Packer articulates the values supporting two models of the justice process. He notes the gulf existing between the "Due Process Model" of criminal administration, with its emphasis on the rights of the individual, and the "Crime Control Model," which sees the regulation of criminal conduct as the most important function of the judicial system.
Part I
Part II
Due Process Values
If the Crime Control Model resembles an assembly line, the Due Process Model looks very much like an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the process. Its ideology is not the converse of that underlying the Crime Control Model. It does not rest on the idea that it is not socially desirable to repress crime, although critics of its application have been known to claim so. Its ideology is composed of a complex of ideas, some of them based on judgments about the efficacy of crime control devices, others having to do with quite different considerations. The ideology of due process is far more deeply impressed on the formal structure of the law than is the ideology of crime control; yet an accurate tracing of the strands that make it up is strangely difficult. What follows is only an attempt at an approximation.
The Due Process Model encounters its rival on the Crime Control Model's own ground in respect to the reliability of fact-finding processes. The Crime Control Model, as we have suggested, places heavy reliance on the ability of investigative and prosecutorial officers, acting in an informal setting in which their distinctive skills are given full sway, to elicit and reconstruct a tolerably accurate account of what actually took place in an alleged criminal event. The Due Process Model rejects this premise and substitutes for it a view of informal, nonadjudicative fact-finding that stresses the possibility of error. People are notoriously poor observers of disturbing events—the more emotion-arousing the context, the greater the possibility that recollection will be incorrect; confessions and admissions by persons in police custody may be induced by physical or psychological coercion so that the police end up hearing what the suspect thinks they want to hear rather than the truth; witnesses may be animated by bias or interest that no one would trouble to discover except one specially charged with protecting the interests of the accused (as the police are not). Considerations of this kind all lead to a rejection of informal fact-finding processes as definitive of factual guilt and to an insistence on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes in which the factual case against the accused is publicly heard by an impartial tribunal and is evaluated only after the accused has had a full opportunity to discredit the case against him. Even then, the distrust of fact-fording processes that animates the Due Process Model is not dissipated. The possibilities of human error being what they are, further scrutiny is necessary, or at least must be available, in case facts have been overlooked or suppressed in the heat of battle.
How far this subsequent scrutiny must be available is a hotly controverted issue today. In the pure Due Process Model the answer would be: at least as long as there is an allegation of factual error that has not received an adjudicative hearing in a fact-finding context. The demand for finality is thus very low in the Due Process Model.
This strand of due process ideology is not enough to sustain the model. If all that were at issue between the two models was a series of questions about the reliability of fact-finding processes, we would have but one model of the criminal process, the nature of whose constituent elements would pose questions of fact not of value. Even if the discussion is confined, for the moment, to the question of reliability, it is apparent that more is at stake than simply an evaluation of what kinds of fact-finding processes, alone or in combination, are likely to produce the most nearly reliable results. The stumbling block is this: How much reliability is compatible with efficiency? Granted that informal fact-finding will make some mistakes that can be remedied if backed up by adjudicative factfinding, the desirability of providing this backup is not affirmed or negated by factual demonstrations or predictions that the increase in reliability will be x percent or x plus n percent. It still remains to ask how much weight is to be given to the competing demands of reliability (a high degree of probability in each case that factual guilt has been accurately determined) and efficiency (expeditious handling of the large numbers of cases that the process ingests). The Crime Control Model is more optimistic about the improbability of error in a significant number of cases: but it is also, though only in part therefore, more tolerant about the amount of error that it will put up with. The Due Process Model insists on the prevention and elimination of mistakes to the extent possible; the Crime Control Model accepts the probability of mistakes up to the level at which they interfere with the goal of repressing crime, either because too many guilty people are escaping or, more subtly, because general awareness of the unreliability of the process leads to a decrease in the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law. In this view, reliability and efficiency are not polar opposites but rather complementary characteristics. The system is reliable because efficient; reliability becomes a matter of independent concern only when it becomes so attenuated as to impair efficiency. All of this the Due Process Model rejects. If efficiency demands shortcuts around reliability, then absolute efficiency must be rejected. The aim of the process is at least as much to protect the factually innocent as it is to convict the factually guilty. It is a little like quality control in industrial technology; tolerable deviation from standard varies with the importance of conformity to standard in the destined uses of the product. The Due Process Model resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input to quality control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output.
All of this is only the beginning of the ideological difference between the two models. The Due Process Model could disclaim any attempt to provide enhanced reliability for the fact-finding process and still produce a set of institutions and processes that would differ sharply from those demanded by the Crime Control Model. Indeed, it may not be too great an oversimplification to assert that in point of historical development the doctrinal pressures emanating from the demands of the Due Process Model have tended to evolve from an original matrix of concern for the maximization of reliability into values quite different and more far-reaching. These values can be expressed in, although not adequately described by, the concept of the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of limitation on official power.
The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that is embodied in the end result of the criminal process is viewed as being the heaviest deprivation that government can inflict on the individual. Furthermore, the processes that culminate in these highly afflictive sanctions are seen as in themselves coercive, restricting, and demeaning. Power is always subject to abuse—sometimes subtle, other times, as in the criminal process, open and ugly. Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive power of the state, the criminal process must, in this model, be subjected to controls that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency.
According to this ideology, maximal efficiency means maximal tyranny. And, although no one would assert that minimal efficiency means minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process Model would accept with considerable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency with which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official oppression of the individual.
The most modest-seeming but potentially far-reaching mechanism by which the Due Process Model implements these antiauthoritarian values is the doctrine of legal guilt. According to this doctrine, a person is not to be held guilty of a crime merely on a showing that in all probability, based upon reliable evidence, he did factually what he is said to have done. Instead, he is to be held guilty if and only if these factual determinations are made in procedurally regular fashion and by authorities acting within competences duly allocated to them. Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even though the factual determination is or might be adverse to him, if various rules designed to protect him and to safeguard the integrity of the process are not given effect: the tribunal that convicts him must have the power to deal with his kind of case (“jurisdiction”) and must be geographically appropriate (“venue”); too long a time must not have elapsed since the offense was committed (“statute of limitations”); he must not have been previously convicted or acquitted of the same or a substantially similar offense (“double jeopardy”); he must not fall within a category of persons, such as children or the insane, who are legally immune to conviction (“criminal responsibility”); and so on. None of these requirements has anything to do with the factual question of whether the person did or did not engage in the conduct that is charged as the offense against him; yet favorable answers to any of them will mean that he is legally innocent. Wherever the competence to make adequate factual determination lies, it is apparent that only a tribunal that is aware of these guilt-defeating doctrines and is willing to apply them can be viewed as competent to make determinations of legal guilt. The police and the prosecutors are ruled out by lack of competence, in the first instance, and by lack of assurance of willingness, in the second. Only an impartial tribunal can be trusted to make determinations of legal as opposed to factual guilt.
In this concept of legal guilt lies the explanation for the apparently quixotic presumption of innocence of which we spoke earlier. A man who, after police investigation, is charged with having committed a crime can hardly be said to be presumptively innocent, if what we mean is factual innocence. But if what we mean is that it has yet to be determined if any of the myriad legal doctrines that serve in one way or another the end of limiting official power through the observance of certain substantive and procedural regularities may be appropriately invoked to exculpate the accused man, it is apparent that as a matter of prediction it cannot be said with confidence that more probably than not he will be found guilty.
Beyond the question of predictability this model posits a functional reason for observing the presumption of innocence: by forcing the state to prove its case against the accused in an adjudicative context, the presumption of innocence serves to force into play all the qualifying and disabling doctrines that limit the use of the criminal sanction against the individual, thereby enhancing his opportunity to secure a favorable outcome. In this sense, the presumption of innocence may be seen to operate as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. By opening up a procedural situation that permits the successful assertion of defenses having nothing to do with factual guilt, it vindicates the proposition that the factually guilty may nonetheless be legally innocent and should therefore be given a chance to qualify for that kind of treatment.
The possibility of legal innocence is expanded enormously when the criminal process is viewed as the appropriate forum for correcting its own abuses. This notion may well account for a greater amount of the distance between the two models than any other. In theory the Crime Control Model can tolerate rules that forbid illegal arrests, unreasonable searches, coercive interrogations, and the like. What it cannot tolerate is the vindication of those rules in the criminal process itself through the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained or through the reversal of convictions in cases where the criminal process has breached the rules laid down for its observance. And the Due Process Model, although it may in the first instance be addressed to the maintenance of reliable fact-finding techniques, comes eventually to incorporate prophylactic and deterrent rules that result in the release of the factually guilty even in cases in which blotting out the illegality would still leave an adjudicative fact-finder convinced of the accused person's guilt. Only by penalizing errant police and prosecutors within the criminal process itself can adequate pressure be maintained, so the argument runs, to induce conformity with the Due Process Model.
Another strand in the complex of attitudes underlying the Due Process Model is the idea—itself a shorthand statement for a complex of attitudes-of equality. This notion has only recently emerged as an explicit basis for pressing the demands of the Due Process Model, but it appears to represent, at least in its potential, a most powerful norm for influencing official conduct. Stated most starkly, the ideal of equality holds that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” The factual predicate underlying this assertion is that there are gross inequalities in the financial means of criminal defendants as a class, that in an adversary system of criminal justice an effective defense is largely a function of the resources that can be mustered on behalf of the accused, and that the very large proportion of criminal defendants who are, operationally speaking, “indigent” will thus be denied an effective defense. This factual premise has been strongly reinforced by recent studies that in turn have been both a cause and an effect of an increasing emphasis upon norms for the criminal process based on the premise.
The norms derived from the premise do not take the form of an insistence upon governmental responsibility to provide literally equal opportunities for all criminal defendants to challenge the process. Rather, they take as their point of departure the notion that the criminal process, initiated as it is by the government and containing as it does the likelihood of severe deprivations at the hands of government, imposes some kind of public obligation to ensure that financial inability does not destroy the capacity of an accused to assert what may be meritorious challenges to the processes being invoked against him. At its most gross, the norm of equality would act to prevent situations in which financial inability forms an absolute barrier to the assertion of a right that is in theory generally available, as where there is a right to appeal that is, however, effectively conditional upon the filing of a trial transcript obtained at the defendant’s expense. Beyond this, it may provide the basis for a claim whenever the system theoretically makes some kind of challenge available to an accused who has the means to press it. If, for example, a defendant who is adequately represented has the opportunity to prevent the case against him from coming to the trial stage by forcing the state to its proof in a preliminary hearing, the norm of equality may be invoked to assert that the same kind of opportunity must be available to others as well. In a sense the system, as it functions for the small minority whose resources permit them to exploit all its defensive possibilities, provides a benchmark by which its functioning in all other cases is to be tested: not, perhaps, to guarantee literal identity but rather to provide a measure of whether the process as a whole is recognizably of the same general order. The demands made by a norm of this kind are likely by their very nature to be quite sweeping. Although the norm's imperatives may be initially limited to determining whether in a particular case the accused was injured or prejudiced by his relative inability to make an appropriate challenge, the norm of equality very quickly moves to another level on which the demand is that the process in general be adapted to minimize discriminations rather than that a mere series of post hoc determinations of discriminations be made or makeable.
It should be observed that the impact of the equality norm will vary greatly depending upon the point in time at which it is introduced into a model of the criminal process. If one were starting from scratch to decide how the process ought to work, the norm of equality would have nothing very important to say on such questions as, for example, whether an accused should have the effective assistance of counsel in deciding whether to enter a plea of guilty. One could decide, on quite independent considerations, that it is or is not a good thing to afford that facility to the generality of persons accused of crime. But the impact of the equality norm becomes far greater when it is brought to bear on a process whose contours have already been shaped. If our model of the criminal process affords defendants who are in a financial position to do so the right to consult a lawyer before entering a plea, then the equality norm exerts powerful pressure to provide such an opportunity to all defendants and to regard the failure to do so as a malfunctioning of the process of whose consequences the accused is entitled to be relieved. In a sense, this has been the role of the equality norm in affecting the real-world criminal process. It has made its appearance on the scene comparatively late and has therefore encountered a system in which the relative financial inability of most persons accused of crime results in treatment very different from that accorded the small minority of the financially capable. For this reason, its impact has already been substantial and may be expected to be even more so in the future.
There is a final strand of thought in the Due Process Model that is often ignored but that needs to be candidly faced if thought on the subject is not to be obscured. This is a mood of skepticism about the morality and utility of the criminal sanction, taken either as a whole or in some of its applications. The subject is a large and complicated one, comprehending as it does much of the intellectual history of our times. It is properly the subject of another essay altogether. To put the matter briefly, one cannot improve upon the statement by Professor Paul Bator:
In summary we are told that the criminal law's notion of just condemnation and punishment is a cruel hypocrisy visited by a smug society on the psychologically and economically crippled; that its premise of a morally autonomous will with at least some measure of choice whether to comply with the values expressed in a penal code is unscientific and outmoded; that its reliance on punishment as an educational and deterrent agent is misplaced, particularly in the case of the very members of society most likely to engage in criminal conduct; and that its failure to provide for individualized and humane rehabilitation of offenders is inhuman and wasteful. 1
This skepticism, which may be fairly said to be widespread among the most influential and articulate contemporary leaders of informed opinion, leads to an attitude toward the processes of the criminal law that, to quote Mr. Bator again, engenders “a peculiar receptivity toward claims of injustice which arise within the traditional structure of the system itself, fundamental disagreement and unease about the very bases of the criminal law has, inevitably, created acute pressure at least to expand and liberalize those of its processes and doctrines which serve to make more tentative its judgments or limit its power.” In short, doubts about the ends for which power is being exercised create pressure to limit the discretion with which that power is exercised.
The point need not be pressed to the extreme of doubts about or rejection of the premises upon which the criminal sanction in general rests. Unease may be stirred simply by reflection on the variety of uses to which the criminal sanction is put and by a judgment that an increasingly large proportion of those uses may represent an unwise invocation of so extreme a sanction. It would be an interesting irony if doubts about the propriety of certain uses of the criminal sanction prove to contribute to a restrictive trend in the criminal process that in the end requires a choice among uses and. finally an abandonment of some of the very uses that stirred the original doubts, but for a reason quite unrelated to those doubts.
There are two kinds of problems that need to be dealt with in any model of the criminal process. One is what the rules shall be. The other is how the rules shall be implemented. The second is at least as important as the first, as we shall see time and again in our detailed development of the models. The distinctive difference between the two models is not only in the rules of conduct that they lay down but also in the sanctions that are to be invoked when a claim is presented that the rules have been breached and, no less importantly, in the timing that is permitted or required for the invocation of those sanctions.
As I have already suggested, the Due Process Model locates at least some of the sanctions for breach of the operative rules in the criminal process itself. The relation between these two aspects of the process—the rules and the sanctions for their breach—is a purely formal one unless there is some mechanism for bringing them into play with each other. The hinge between them in the Due Process Model is the availability of legal counsel. This has a double aspect. Many of the rules that the model requires are couched in terms of the availability of counsel to do various things at various stages of the process—this is the conventionally recognized aspect; beyond it, there is a pervasive assumption that counsel is necessary in order to invoke sanctions for breach of any of the rules. The more freely available these sanctions are, the more important is the role of counsel in seeing to it that the sanctions are appropriately invoked. If the process is seen as a series of occasions for checking its own operation, the role of counsel is a much more nearly central one than is the case in a process that is seen as primarily concerned with expeditious determination of factual guilt. And if equality of operation is a governing norm, the availability of counsel is seen as requiring it for all. Of all the controverted aspects of the criminal process, the right to counsel, including the role of government in its provision, is the most dependent on what one’s model of the process looks like, and the least susceptible of resolution unless one has confronted the antinomies of the two models.
I do not mean to suggest that questions about the right to counsel disappear if one adopts a model of the process that conforms more or less closely to the Crime Control Model, but only that such questions become absolutely central if one’s model moves very far down the spectrum of possibilities toward the pure Due Process Model. The reason for this centrality is to be found in the assumption underlying both models that the process is an adversary one in which the initiative in invoking relevant rules rests primarily on the parties concerned, the state, and the accused. One could construct models that placed central responsibility on adjudicative agents such as committing magistrates and trial judges. And there are, as we shall see, marginal but nonetheless important adjustments in the role of the adjudicative agents that enter into the models with which we are concerned. For present purposes it is enough to say that these adjustments are marginal, that the animating presuppositions that underlie both models in the context of the American criminal system relegate the adjudicative agents to a relatively passive role, and therefore place central importance on the role of counsel.
One last introductory note: . . . What assumptions do we make about the sources of authority to shape the real-world operations of the criminal process? Recognizing that our models are only models, what agencies of government have the power to pick and choose between their competing demands? Once again, the limiting features of the American context come into play. Ours is not a system of legislative supremacy. The distinctively American institution of judicial review exercises a limiting and ultimately a shaping influence on the criminal process. Because the Crime Control Model is basically an affirmative model, emphasizing at every turn the existence and exercise of official power, its validating authority is ultimately legislative (although proximately administrative). Because the Due Process Model is basically a negative model, asserting limits on the nature of official power and on the modes of its exercise, its validating authority is judicial and requires an appeal to supralegislative law, to the law of the Constitution. To the extent that tensions between the two models are resolved by deference to the Due Process Model, the authoritative force at work is the judicial power, working in the distinctively judicial mode of invoking the sanction of nullity. That is at once the strength and the weakness of the Due Process Model: its strength because in our system the appeal to the Constitution provides the last and overriding word; its weakness because saying no in specific cases is an exercise in futility unless there is a general willingness on the part of the officials who operate the process to apply negative prescriptions across the board. It is no accident that statements reinforcing the Due Process Model come from the courts, while at the same time facts denying it are established by the police and prosecutors.
NOTE
1. Paul Bator, “Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,” Harvard Law Review 76 (1963): 441-442.
Source: Reprinted by http://www.hhs.csus.edu
from The Limits of the Criminal Sanction by Herbert L. Packer, with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press. 1968 by Herbert L. Packer.
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| posted by Jodi Santoso @ 3:18 AM
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