Anti (STATE) Terrorism

2010-08-23T22:58:00.000-07:00

Press Release Elsam : Putusan MK tentang Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati, Terjebak Positivisme Hukum Formal

2008-11-08T04:11:00.000-08:00

Press Release
No : 05/DP/Elsam/X/08

Putusan MK tentang Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati:
Terjebak Positivisme Hukum Formal

Dalam putusan yang dibacakan majelis hakim konstitusi yang dipimpin Mahfud MD dalam
sidang di Mahkamah Konstitusi, Jakarta, Selasa 21 Oktober 2008, Mahkamah Konstitusi
menolak permohonan Amrozi, Muklas, dan Imam Samudra yang mempersoalkan hukuman mati
dengan cara ditembak. Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) menegaskan tidak ada satu cara pun yang
menjamin tiadanya rasa sakit dalam pelaksanaan pidana mati. Semua mengandung risiko
terjadinya ketidaktepatan yang menimbulkan rasa sakit.

Dalam Putusannya, MK menegaskan bahwa tata cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati di Indonesia
adalah menurut UU No.2/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelaksanaan Hukuman Mati yang
merupakan lex specialis yang menegasikan pasal 11 KUHAP. Lebih lanjut, MK menyatakan UU
No. 2/Pnps/1964 tentang Tata Cara Pelakasaan Hukuman Mati yang dijatuhkan oleh
Pengadilan di Lingkungan Peradilan Umum dan Militer tidak bertentangan dengan Pasal 28I
ayat (1) Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945.

Di tengah pro-kontra wacana terhadap hukuman mati di Indonesia, prinsip dasar atas
penghormatan fundamental terhadap HAM semestinya menjadi pijakan utama. Hak untuk hidup
(right to life); merupakan kategori hak yang tidak bisa dilanggar, dikurangi serta
dibatasi dalam keadaan apapun, termasuk dalam batasan regulasi formal. Apalagi, hal ini
secara jelas tercantum dalam Konstitusi RI. Mahkamah Konstitusi, sebagai pengawal
pelaksanaan UUD 1945, seharusnya menjalankan amanat konstitusi tersebut dengan
memberikan amanat penghapusan hukuman mati. Terlebih dalam sistem hukum di Indonesia,
hukuman mati bukanlah cara yang efektif untuk menghentikan suatu tindak pidana. Sistem
peradilan kita masih belum dapat menjamin sebuah proses yang jujur (fair trial),
sehingga kemungkinan terjadinya peradilan sesat khususnya kesalahan penerapan hukum
cukup besar akibat korupsi, birokratisasi, diskriminasi dan bias kelas. Dalam konteks
itu, kehadiran sanksi hukuman mati tentu tidak dapat memperbaiki satu keputusan hakim
yang salah. Di sisi lain, tidak ada pembuktian akademis bahwa pelaksanaan hukuman mati
secara efektif memberikan efek jera kepada pelaku kejahatan dan mengurangi tindak pidana
yang terjadi.

Putusan MK yang melihat bahwa pelaksanaan hukuman mati tidak bertentangan dengan Pasal
28I ayat (1) UUD 1945 karena menganggap tata cara pelaksanaan hukuman mati berdasarkan
UU No.2/Pnps/1964 bukan merupakan tindakan penyiksaan adalah sebuah keputusan yang
terjebak positivisme hukum formal, karena hanya melihat unsur yang digugat saja, yaitu
penyiksaan. Padahal, Pasal 28I ayat (1) UUD 1945 secara tegas dan jelas mengatur
mengenai hak-hak dasar warga negara sebagai satu kesatuan yang utuh, di mana dengan
tegas dinyatakan bahwa hak untuk hidup merupakan hak dasar yang harus dijamin oleh
negara.

Putusan MK ini secara nyata telah mengabaikan perkembangan ilmu pengetahuan hukum dan
peraturan perundang-undangan di Indonesia yang telah mengalami perubahan paradigma
sebagaimana terlihat dalam RUU KUHP yang sudah menempatkan hukuman mati sebagai pidana
yang bersifat khusus dan diancamkan secara alternatif. Pidana mati dapat dijatuhkan
secara bersyarat, dengan memberikan masa percobaan, sehingga dalam tenggang waktu masa
percobaan tersebut terpidana diharapkan dapat memperbaiki diri sehingga pidana mati
tidak perlu dilaksanakan. Demikian juga dengan Statuta Roma Mahkamah Pidana
Internasional (Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998) yang rencananya
akan diratifikasi Pemerintah Indonesia pada tahun 2008 ini, yang sama sekali tidak
mengatur mengenai ancaman pidana mati. Hukuman dalam mekanisme International Criminal
Court juga hanya berupa hukuman penjara yang terdiri dari hukuman penjara seumur hidup
untuk kejahatan yang sangat serius dan hukuman penjara maksimum 30 tahun.

Disamping itu, penerapan hukuman mati bertentangan dengan ketentuan hukum hak asasi
manusia Internasional yang secara tegas menyatakan hukuman mati bertentangan dengan
prinsip-prinsip yang diatur di dalam konvenan Internasional Hak-hak Sipil dan Politik
(International in Civil and Political Rigts-ICCPR.). Hak untuk hidup (rights to life)
–yaitu pada bagian III Pasal 6 (1) –menyatakan bahwa setiap manusia berhak atas hak
untuk hidup dan mendapatkan perlindungan hukum dan tiada yang dapat mencabut hak itu.
Perlu diingat bahwa prinsip-prinsip yang diatur dalam ICCPR telah menjadi bagian dari
hukum nasional Indonesia, melalui UU No.12 Tahun 2005 tentang Ratifikasi Kovenan Hak-hak
Sipil dan Politik.

Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi ini sangatlah ironi, mengingat dasar filosofis dan
konstitusi negara Indonesia yang kemudian dikonkritkan lagi dalam Ketetapan MPR Nomor
XVII/MPR/1998 telah secara eksplisit menyebutkan bahwa pandangan dan sikap bangsa
Indonesia mengenai hak asasi manusia adalah bersumber dari ajaran agama, nilai moral
universal, dan nilai luhur budaya bangsa, serta berdasarkan Pancasila, dimana hak asasi
manusia adalah hak dasar yang melekat pada diri manusia yang sifatnya kodrati dan
universal sebagai karunia Tuhan Yang Maha Esa dan berfungsi untuk menjamin kelangsungan
hidup, kemerdekaan, perkembangan manusia dan masyarakat, yang tidak boleh diabaikan,
dirampas atau diganggu gugat oleh siapa pun.

Oleh karenanya, mempertahankan penerapan hukuman mati dalam pendekatan hukum positif
semata jelas tidak dapat dipertanggungjawabkan. Dalam kondisi demikian, perubahan
terhadap hukum nasional menuju penghapusan hukuman mati menjadi sebuah keharusan.
Terlebih lagi konstitusi negara telah melahirkan pengakuan akan hak untuk hidup yang
tidak dapat dikurangi atas alasan apapun, sehingga penghapusan hukuman mati diseluruh
ketentuan hukum adalah kewajiban konstitusional.

Jakarta, 24 Oktober 2008
Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Masyarakat (ELSAM)

Indriaswaty Dyah Saptaningrung, S.H, LLM
Asisten Deputi Direktur Program

Kontak : Indriaswaty DS (0813 80305 728)

Pergeseran Makna Terorisme

2008-06-18T20:21:00.000-07:00

M Jodi Santoso

Dalam mengkaji terorisme, satu hal yang perlu diingat adalah adanya perbedaan sudut pandang tentang terorisme. Lebih dari itu, terorisme hingga saat ini menjadi sebuah gejala sosial yang kompleks. Sudut pandang dan kepentingan para pihak larut dalam memaknai terorisme. Pemaknaan dari sudut pandang yang berbeda tersebut yang menyebabkan terjadinya pergeseran makna terorisme dari masa kemasa. Terorisme pada awal kemunculannya berkonotasi positif, kini menjadi sebuah kejahatan berat dan kejahatan terhadap kemanusian (crime againt humanity).

Istilah teror (isme), pertama kali, populer pada masa Revolusi Perancis (1789-1794). Akan tetapi, praktik terorisme itu sendiri terjadi jauh sebelumnya. Dalam catatan sejarah, terorisme telah dipraktikkan manusia sejak zaman Yunani kuno. Xenophon (431-350 SM) misalnya, menuliskan dalam bukunya tentang terorisme dalam term "perang psikologis" untuk menaklukkan musuh. Pada awal abad masehi tercatat nama Kaisar Rome Tiberius (14-37) dan Caligula (37-41) yang melakukan terorisme terhadap lawan-lawan politiknya.

Aksi teror juga dilakukan Zealot (hidup pada 66-73 M), sebuah organisasi partai politik yang beroposisi dengan pemerintahan Herodes yang menentang penjajah Roma. Mereka menuntut kemurnian religius dan menentang segala tindakan asusila dan tindakan yang bersifat anti Yahudi. Mereka menggunakan pisau kecil yang disebut sica yang disembunyikan di balik jaket. Dengan senjata sica tersebut, aksi Zealot sering disebut Sicarii. Aksi sicarri dilakukan dengan cara bercampur orang-orang dipasar. Jika mereka melihat suatu pelanggaran mereka langsung mengambil pisau dan menikam si pelanggar. Metode yang mereka gunakan adalah praktek pembunuhan teroganisir di zaman kuno. Tindakan ini bersifat acak dan menimbulkan ketakutan masyarakat. Motivasi kelompok Zealot adalah agama dan didukung oleh kitab suci.

Teror sebagai sebuah aksi yang sistematis dikenal sejak Revolusi Perancis (1789-1794). Pada masa itu, muncul apa yang dikenal dengan French Revolution’s terrorism atau regime de la terreur pimpinan Maximilien Robespierre. Regime de la terreur digunakan sebagai instrumen untuk mendirikan Revolusionary State yaitu membentuk sebuah masyarakat baru yang lebih baik. Selain mempunyai kaitan erat dengan revolusi, Maximilien Robespierre, sang pemimpin gerakan, mengaitkan teror dengan kebaikan (virtue) dan demokrasi (democracy). Robespierre menyebutkan : virtue, without which terror is evil; terror, without which virtue is helpless. … terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; its therefore an emanation of virtue.

Terdapat dua karakteristik utama dari French Revolution’s terrorism. Pertama, regime de la terreur tidak dilakukan dengan acak random dan tidak juga indiskriminasi (neither random nor indiscriminate), tetapi dilakukan secara terorganisir (organized), terarah dan berhati-hati (deliberate), serta sistematis (systematic). Karakteristik ini yang membedakan regime de la terreur dengan aksi terror yang digambarkan saat ini. Kedua, tujuan French Revolution’s terrorism (regime de la terreur) adalah untuk membentuk sebuah masyarakat baru yang lebih baik (a new and batter society).

Pertengahan abad ke-19, di Eropa, revolusi Perancis mengilhami munculnya sentimentil anti monarki (anti penguasa). Pada abad ini, muncul aksi era terorisme baru di mana terorisme dikonotasikan dengan gerakan anti pemerintahan. Aksi-aksi teror digunakan sebagai taktik untuk menggulingkan orang-orang berkuasa. Carlo Pisacane, seorang extrim Republika Italia, melakukan gerakan revolusioner yang disandarkan pada teori “the propaganda by deed”.

Hingga menjelang perang dunia I, terrorisme berkonotasi revolutioner. Bersamaan dengan perang dunia II dan semangat pergerakan kemerdekaan, penggunaan istilah teorisme digunakan dalam perspektif berbeda. Pertama, teroris dikonotasikan dengan gerakan revolusioner. Dan, kedua, mengacu pada pemberontakan yang dilakukan kaum nasionalis/anti-colonialis. Konotasi kedua memicu ketidaksenangan para pejuang kemerdekaan (negara dunia ketiga) dengan stigma teroris. mereka dengan tegas menolak stigma teroris yang melekat pada mereka. Bagi mereka (pejuang kemerdekaan) berjuang untuk kemerdekaan dan kebebasan demi tanah air dari penjajahan bukan terorisme tetapi freedom fighters.

Pada awal tahun 1990, muncul istilah narco terrorism dan istilah gray area phenomenon. Istilah Pertama muncul bersamaan dengan gerakan sekelompok orang dengan motivasi ekonomi yang bergelut dalam peragangan obat terlarang. Narco terrorism muncul akibat pertemuan antara penjualan obat terlarang dengan penjualan senjata. Sedangkan istilah gray area phenomenon digunakan pada gerakan yang mengancam stabilitas nasional oleh orang atau kelompol bukan negara.

Terorisme dalam sistem peradilan pidana

2008-06-18T01:37:00.000-07:00

M Jodi Santoso

Sumber : Harian Tempo, 27 Oktober 2003

Dua tahun masa war of terrorism yang dimotori Amerika Serikat masih belum menyentuh akar pemasalahan. Yang tersisa kini kedukaan para keluarga korban dan ketidakpuasan masyarakat terhadap penanganan tindak pidana terorisme. Menolak terorisme adalah wajib tetapii menyelesaikan akar permasalahan merupakan kunci utama dari sikap penolakan terhadap terorisme. Amerika Serikat hanya mengejar pelaku teror tetapi belum pernah memberi jawaban secara resmi dan lengkap terhadap tuntutan dan motivasi para teroris (baca Osama bin Laden dkk.). Mengurai, mengidentifikasi, dan menyelesaikan akar permasalahan merupakan sikap penolakan terhadap terorisme yang paling penting untuk mencegah terjadinya terorisme di masa mendatang. Terorisme bukan problem lokal tetapi problem internaional, Playground-nya berskala international. Terorisme dapat terjadi dimana saja, kapan saja dan targetnya pun siapa saja.( Ong Yen Nee, 2002). Terorisme bukan problem Amerika semata tatapi manjadi masalah seluruh umat manusia.

Dalam sistem peradilan pidana internasional, tindak pidana teroris manjadi materi diskusi yang cukup menarik. Hampir semua ahli hukum pidana dan kriminolog mengatakan bahwa tindak pidana terorisme merupakan extraordinary crime dan proses peradilannya pun berbeda dengan tindak pidana biasa. Karena sifatnya yang extraordinary crime inilah hampir semua negara mengunakan undang-undang khusus dalam menanggulangi tindak pidan terorisme. Akan tetapi, Kent Roach (Canada), Adnan Buyung Nasution dan beberapa ahli hukum pidana dan HAM (antara lain, Koalisi Untuk Keselamatan Masyarakat Sipil) menolak pandangan demikian. Bagii mereka, terorisme merupakan tindak pidana biasa dan penangganannyapun cukup dengan aturan perundang-undang yang berlaku bagi tindak pidana lainnya. Dalam kontek sistem peradilan pidana cukup dengan ketentuan KUHP dan KUHAP saja tidak perlu menggunakan UU Antiteroris atau yang lainnya seperti ISA (Internal scurity act).

Namun demikian, tidak dapat disanggah bahwa tindak pidana terorisme dapat dikategorikan sebagia mala per se bukan termasuk mala prohibita. Hal ini karena terorisme merupakan crime against concience, menjadi jahat bukan karena dilarang oleh undang-undang tetapi karena pada dasarnya terorisme merupakan tindakan tercela.(Muladi,2002).

Walaupun terorisme dianggap sebagai extraordinary crime dan crime against humanity, terorisme bukan merupakan tindak pidana dalam yuridiksi International Criminal Court (ICC). Amerika Serikat dengan tegas menolak usulan beberapa negara yang menghendaki tindak pidana terorisme sebagai tindak pidana yang berada dalam yurisdiksi ICC. Dengan tidak masuknya terorisme maka menurut Art. 5 Rome Statute of the international Criminal Court (Statuta Roma Tentang Mahkamah Pidana Internasional) hanya empat tindak pidana yang dianggap sebagai tindak pidana paling serius, yaitu : (1) genocida; (2) tindak pidana terhadap kemanusian; (3) tindak pidana perang; dan (4) agresi. Sampai sekarang, Amerika Serikat belum menandatangani International criminal court (ICC). Pada hal dukungan Amerika Serikat sangat dibutuhkan dalam upaya dunia internasional untuk segera pembentukan Mahkamah Pidana Internasional. Di sinilah mulai muncul anggapan negatif atas ambivalensi Amerika Serikat dalam upaya penanganan terorisme. Pada sisi lain Amerika Serikat menolak terorisme masuk dalam yuridiksi ICC dan sampai sekarang belum menandatangai ICC pda sisi lain Amerika Serikat, melalui pernyataan resmi George W. Bush tanggal 11 Oktober 2001, terorisme sebagai Sebuah Serangan Terhadap Peradaban Dunia..

Ambivalensi sikap Amerika juga tercermin dalam law enforcement. Amerika Serikat telah melanggar prinsip-prinsip perlindungan HAM dalam criminal justice process terhadap pelaku terorisme. Sikap ini berbeda dengan upaya perlindungan HAM dalam administrasi peradilan pidana (protection of human right in criminal justice administration) di mana Amerika Serikat sebagai pendukung utamanya. Bahkan konsep perlindungan HAM dalam sistem peradilan Pidana (criminal Justice system) yang berkembang di Amerika Serikat telah menjadi kiblat bagi negara-negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, administrasi peradilan pidana yang telah dibangun selama berabad-abad tersebut sama sekali tidak berlaku bagi pelaku tindak pidana terorisme. Amerika Serikat telah berhasil membangun sistem peradilan pidana yang kondusif bagi perlindungan tersangka pelaku tindak pidana di negaranya tetapi gagal mengembangankan sistem peradilan pidana internasional.

Catatan terpenting yang dapat dicermati selama dua tahun masa war of terrorism adalah Amerika Serikat telah memutar “jarum jam” administrasi peradilan pidana. Kebijakan politik luar negeri Amerika Serikat telah menghancurkan bangunan konsep dan praktik peradilan pidana yang memberikan perlindungan hak tersangka yang dibangun sejak berabad-abad tahun yang lalu. Amerika Serikat telah membawa kembali dunia peradilan pidana ke abad 13 di mana metode yang digunakan dalam administrasi peradilan pidana adalah iquisitorial method ketika pertama kali muncul dalam sejarah peradilan pidana.

Karakteristik penyelesaian perkara pidana berdasarkan sistem model iquisitorial seperti antara lain : dilakukan secara rahasia, tersangka pelaku tindak pidana ditempatkan terasing dan tidak diperkenankan berkomunikasi dengan puhak lain termasuk keluarga, Pemeriksaan saksi terpisah. Tujuan pemeriksaan waktu itu adalah untuk memperoleh pengakuan (confession) dari tersangka. Apabila tersangka tidak mau secara sukarela mengakui perbuatannya atau kesalahannya maka petugas pemeriksa akan memperpanjang penderitaan tersangka melalui cara penyiksaan (toture) sampai diperoleh pengakuan. Tertuduh tidak berhak didampingi pembela, tidak ada perlindungan dan jaminan hak asasi. Karakteristik yang demikian sebenarnya telah lama ditinggalkan. Akan tetapi, Amerika dalam penanganan tindak pidana terorisme telah mengangkat kembali administrasi peradilan pidana yang demikian dalam penangganan tindal pidana terorisme. Penahanan para tersangaka di Guntanamo, proses penyidikan yang rahasia, dan menghilangkan hak-hak dasar seorang tersangka lainnya telah dihilangkan.

Dalam Konteks ke Indonesiaan

UU Antiterorisme memberikan kewenangan hakim dalam proses pra-ajudikasi (Pasal 26 ayat (2) dan penjelasan umum). Untuk melindungi hak-hak tersangka pelaku tindak pidana terorisme dan untuk auditing terhadap laporan intelijen telah dibentuk lembaga baru yang bernama “Hearing”. Akan tetapi, bagaimana bentuk dan mekanisme bekerjanya lembaga baru tersebut sampai sekarang “belum jelas”. Sehingga bukan hal yang aneh apabila di Solo, Ketua Pengadilan Negeri Solo menganggap penangkapan terhadap tersangka pelaku tindak pidana terorisme tidak prosedural. (Tempo, Rabu, 17 september 2002). Pernyataan tersebut mengindikasikan belum berjalannya integrated administration of criminal justice menurut Undang-Undang Antiteroris.

Pasal 26 ayat (2) Perpu Antiterorisme menyebutkan bahwa “ Penetapan bahwa sudah dapat atau diperoleh bukti permulaan yang cukup sebagaimana dimaksud dalam ayat (1) harus dilakukan proses pemeriksaan oleh Ketua atau Wakil Ketua Pengadilan Negeri. Sedangkan dalam ayat (4) di jelaskan bahwa : “Jika dalam pemeriksaan sebagaimana dimaksud dalam ayat (2) ditetapkan adanya bukti permulaan yang cukup, maka Ketua Pengadilan Negeri segera memerintahkan dilaksanakan penyidikan.” Ketentuan Pasal 26 tersebut di atas dengan jelas memberikan kewenangan kepada Pengadilan dalam hal ini Ketua dan Wakil Ketua Pengadilan Negeri dalam proses pra-ajudikasi (proses peradilan sebelum sidang pengadilan). Akan tetapi keterlibatan pengadilan tersebur hanya sebatas pada pemerikasaan terhadap informasi intelijen (pasal 26 ayat (1) dan (2)).

Dalam pasal 26 ayat (1) disebutkan bahwa: “(1) Untuk memperoleh bukti permulaan yang cukup, penyidik dapat menggunakan setiap laporan intelijen.” Politik hukum pidana dengan menggunakan istilah “dapat menggunakan” dalam ayat (1) tersebut memberikan kemungkinan kepada Kepolisian menggunakan sumber, data, atau laporan lain untuk digunakan sebagai bukti awal yan kuat untuk menduga dan/atau melakukan penangkapan dan penahanan terhadap tersangka tindak pidana terorisme. Konsekuensi logis yang mungkin timbul dalam masalah tersebut adalah “pengingkaran” sumber informasi apabila terdapat gugatan praperadilan darii tersangka, keluarga, atau penasihat hukumnya.

Sisi lain dari UU Antiterorisme adalah pemberian kewenangan yang sangat besar kepada aparat penegak hukum dalam administrasi peradilan pidana. Pengungkapan fakta secara efisien a la Crime Control Model-nya Herbert L. Packer tercermin dalam proses peradilan pidana terhadap tindak pidana terorisme. Sedangkan kebijakan hukum pidana yang dilakukan oleh DPR (dan Pemerintah) dalam UU antiterorisme mengingatkan kita pada analisis Kent Roach bahwa due process can be for Crime control.(Kent Roach, 1919651: 21)

Mungkinkah dengan lembaga “Hearing”, Indonesia mampu mempertahankan prinsip due process of law dalam sistem peradilan pidana. Atau lembaga ini sengaja dibentuk untuk melegitimasi laporan intelijen dan pada gilirannya mengikuti langkah Amerika Serikat untuk membawa kembali sistem peradilan pidana ke abad ke-13 dengan model Inquisitoril yang menindas. Quo Vadis sistem peradilan pidana?

Statement of THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

2007-08-06T02:43:00.000-07:00

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

ADDRESS ON THE LAUNCH OF
UNITING AGAINST TERRORISM:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A GLOBAL
COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY
New York, 2 May 2006

Mr. President,

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen,

I deeply regret that last week, in the 5th Committee, Member States were unable to reach consensus on the proposals I had put before you for management reform. In spite of this, I am convinced that all Member States remain committed to reform in principle, and I urge you to work together to rebuild the spirit of mutual trust that is essential to the smooth functioning of this Organization.

I am, as always, ready to help you in your continued search for agreement on ways to pursue the agenda set out in the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit. In particular, you will recall that in that Document, your Heads of State and Government asked me to “submit proposals to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and enhance coordination of United Nations activities in this regard”. And you will recall that they also urged you to develop without delay the elements I had identified, “with a view to adopting and implementing a strategy to promote comprehensive, coordinated and consistent responses, at the national, regional and international level, to counter terrorism”.

Today, I have the privilege of presenting to you my vision on that matter, contained in the document Uniting against terrorism: Recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy.

These recommendations stem from a fundamental conviction which we all share: that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, is unacceptable and can never be justified.

Uniting around that conviction is the basis for what I hope will be a collective global effort to fight terrorism -- an effort bringing together Governments, the United Nations and other international organizations, civil society and the private sector -- each using their comparative advantage to supplement the others’ efforts.

In formulating my recommendations, I have built further on the “five Ds”-- the fundamental components which I first outlined in Madrid last year. They are:

* dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it;
* denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack;
* deterring States from supporting terrorism;
* developing State capacity to defeat terrorism, and;
* defending human rights.

I believe all five are interlinked conditions crucial to the success of any strategy against terrorism. To succed, we sill need to make progress on all these fronts.

Implementing a global strategy requires us to dissuade people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it, by driving a wedge between terrorists and their potential constituencies. We need to launch a global campaign of Governments, the UN, civil society and the private sector, with the message that terrorism is unacceptable in any form, and that there are far better and more effective ways for those with genuine grievances to seek redress. One of the clearest and most powerful ways we can do that is by refocusing our attention on the victims. It is high time we took serious and concerted steps to build international solidarity with them, respecting their dignity as well as expressing our compassion.

Denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack means denying them access both to conventional weapons and to weapons of mass destruction. That will require innovative thinking from all of us about today’s threats -- including those which States cannot address by themselves, such as bioterrorism. Similarly, it will mean working together to counter terrorists’ growing use of the Internet. We must find ways to make sure that this powerful tool becomes a weapon in our hands, not in theirs.

Our work in deterring States from supporting terrorism must be rooted firmly in the international rule of law -- creating a solid legal basis for common actions, and holding States accountable for their performance in meeting their obligations. This work is intimately linked with the need to develop State capacity to defeat terrorism.

In response to a request I received last December from the President of this Assembly, the document I am presenting today elaborates on steps to build state capacity, and to strengthen the Organization’s work in this field. The UN system has a vital contribution to make in all the relevant areas -- from promoting the rule of law and effective criminal justice systems to ensuring countries have the means to counter the financing of terrorism; from strengthening capacity to prevent nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, to improving the ability of countries to provide assistance and support for victims and their families.

Finally, defending human rights runs like a scarlet thread through the report. It is a prerequisite to every aspect of any effective counter-terrorism strategy. It is the bond that brings the different components together. That means the human rights of all -- of the victims of terrorism, of those suspected of terrorism, of those affected by the consequences of terrorism.

States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law. Any strategy that compromises human rights will play right into the hands of the terrorists.

My dear friends,

All States, in every region -- large or small, strong or weak -- are vulnerable to terrorism and its consequences. They all stand to benefit from a strategy to counter it. They all have a role to play in shaping such a strategy, in implementing it, and in ensuring that it is updated continuously to respond to challenges as they evolve.

It is also essential that Member States conclude, as soon as possible, a Comprehensive Convention on International terrorism. However, lack of progress in building consensus on a Convention cannot be a reason for delay in agreeing on a strategy.

By instructing you to adopt and implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy, your Heads of State and Government have given you a momentous challenge, and a historic opportunity.

By rising to that challenge, you will demonstrate the resolve of the international community, and lay the foundations of a truly global response to this vicious global scourge. I hope my recommendations will help you in that vital mission.
Thank you very much.

tecno

2007-07-29T07:50:00.000-07:00

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2007-07-06T01:36:00.000-07:00

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Two Models of the Criminal Process ( I I)

2007-06-28T03:18:00.000-07:00

by
HERBERT L. PACKER

Reprinted and published by http://www.hhs.csus.edu
from The Limits of the Criminal Sanction by Herbert L. Packer, with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press.  1968 by Herbert L. Packer.

In one of the most important contributions to systematic thought about the administration of criminal justice, Herbert Packer articulates the values supporting two models of the justice process. He notes the gulf existing between the "Due Process Model" of criminal administration, with its emphasis on the rights of the individual, and the "Crime Control Model," which sees the regulation of criminal conduct as the most important function of the judicial system.

Part I

Part II

Due Process Values

If the Crime Control Model resembles an assembly line, the Due Process Model looks very much like an obstacle course. Each of its successive stages is designed to present formidable impediments to carrying the accused any further along in the process. Its ideology is not the converse of that underlying the Crime Control Model. It does not rest on the idea that it is not socially desirable to repress crime, although critics of its application have been known to claim so. Its ideology is composed of a complex of ideas, some of them based on judgments about the efficacy of crime control devices, others having to do with quite different considerations. The ideology of due process is far more deeply impressed on the formal structure of the law than is the ideology of crime control; yet an accurate tracing of the strands that make it up is strangely difficult. What follows is only an attempt at an approximation.

The Due Process Model encounters its rival on the Crime Control Model's own ground in respect to the reliability of fact-finding processes. The Crime Control Model, as we have suggested, places heavy reliance on the ability of investigative and prosecutorial officers, acting in an informal setting in which their distinctive skills are given full sway, to elicit and reconstruct a tolerably accurate account of what actually took place in an alleged criminal event. The Due Process Model rejects this premise and substitutes for it a view of informal, nonadjudicative fact-finding that stresses the possibility of error. People are notoriously poor observers of disturbing events—the more emotion-arousing the context, the greater the possibility that recollection will be incorrect; confessions and admissions by persons in police custody may be induced by physical or psychological coercion so that the police end up hearing what the suspect thinks they want to hear rather than the truth; witnesses may be animated by bias or interest that no one would trouble to discover except one specially charged with protecting the interests of the accused (as the police are not). Considerations of this kind all lead to a rejection of informal fact-finding processes as definitive of factual guilt and to an insistence on formal, adjudicative, adversary fact-finding processes in which the factual case against the accused is publicly heard by an impartial tribunal and is evaluated only after the accused has had a full opportunity to discredit the case against him. Even then, the distrust of fact-fording processes that animates the Due Process Model is not dissipated. The possibilities of human error being what they are, further scrutiny is necessary, or at least must be available, in case facts have been overlooked or suppressed in the heat of battle.

How far this subsequent scrutiny must be available is a hotly controverted issue today. In the pure Due Process Model the answer would be: at least as long as there is an allegation of factual error that has not received an adjudicative hearing in a fact-finding context. The demand for finality is thus very low in the Due Process Model.

This strand of due process ideology is not enough to sustain the model. If all that were at issue between the two models was a series of questions about the reliability of fact-finding processes, we would have but one model of the criminal process, the nature of whose constituent elements would pose questions of fact not of value. Even if the discussion is confined, for the moment, to the question of reliability, it is apparent that more is at stake than simply an evaluation of what kinds of fact-finding processes, alone or in combination, are likely to produce the most nearly reliable results. The stumbling block is this: How much reliability is compatible with efficiency? Granted that informal fact-finding will make some mistakes that can be remedied if backed up by adjudicative factfinding, the desirability of providing this backup is not affirmed or negated by factual demonstrations or predictions that the increase in reliability will be x percent or x plus n percent. It still remains to ask how much weight is to be given to the competing demands of reliability (a high degree of probability in each case that factual guilt has been accurately determined) and efficiency (expeditious handling of the large numbers of cases that the process ingests). The Crime Control Model is more optimistic about the improbability of error in a significant number of cases: but it is also, though only in part therefore, more tolerant about the amount of error that it will put up with. The Due Process Model insists on the prevention and elimination of mistakes to the extent possible; the Crime Control Model accepts the probability of mistakes up to the level at which they interfere with the goal of repressing crime, either because too many guilty people are escaping or, more subtly, because general awareness of the unreliability of the process leads to a decrease in the deterrent efficacy of the criminal law. In this view, reliability and efficiency are not polar opposites but rather complementary characteristics. The system is reliable because efficient; reliability becomes a matter of independent concern only when it becomes so attenuated as to impair efficiency. All of this the Due Process Model rejects. If efficiency demands shortcuts around reliability, then absolute efficiency must be rejected. The aim of the process is at least as much to protect the factually innocent as it is to convict the factually guilty. It is a little like quality control in industrial technology; tolerable deviation from standard varies with the importance of conformity to standard in the destined uses of the product. The Due Process Model resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input to quality control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output.

All of this is only the beginning of the ideological difference between the two models. The Due Process Model could disclaim any attempt to provide enhanced reliability for the fact-finding process and still produce a set of institutions and processes that would differ sharply from those demanded by the Crime Control Model. Indeed, it may not be too great an oversimplification to assert that in point of historical development the doctrinal pressures emanating from the demands of the Due Process Model have tended to evolve from an original matrix of concern for the maximization of reliability into values quite different and more far-reaching. These values can be expressed in, although not adequately described by, the concept of the primacy of the individual and the complementary concept of limitation on official power.

The combination of stigma and loss of liberty that is embodied in the end result of the criminal process is viewed as being the heaviest deprivation that government can inflict on the individual. Furthermore, the processes that culminate in these highly afflictive sanctions are seen as in themselves coercive, restricting, and demeaning. Power is always subject to abuse—sometimes subtle, other times, as in the criminal process, open and ugly. Precisely because of its potency in subjecting the individual to the coercive power of the state, the criminal process must, in this model, be subjected to controls that prevent it from operating with maximal efficiency.

According to this ideology, maximal efficiency means maximal tyranny. And, although no one would assert that minimal efficiency means minimal tyranny, the proponents of the Due Process Model would accept with considerable equanimity a substantial diminution in the efficiency with which the criminal process operates in the interest of preventing official oppression of the individual.

The most modest-seeming but potentially far-reaching mechanism by which the Due Process Model implements these antiauthoritarian values is the doctrine of legal guilt. According to this doctrine, a person is not to be held guilty of a crime merely on a showing that in all probability, based upon reliable evidence, he did factually what he is said to have done. Instead, he is to be held guilty if and only if these factual determinations are made in procedurally regular fashion and by authorities acting within competences duly allocated to them. Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even though the factual determination is or might be adverse to him, if various rules designed to protect him and to safeguard the integrity of the process are not given effect: the tribunal that convicts him must have the power to deal with his kind of case (“jurisdiction”) and must be geographically appropriate (“venue”); too long a time must not have elapsed since the offense was committed (“statute of limitations”); he must not have been previously convicted or acquitted of the same or a substantially similar offense (“double jeopardy”); he must not fall within a category of persons, such as children or the insane, who are legally immune to conviction (“criminal responsibility”); and so on. None of these requirements has anything to do with the factual question of whether the person did or did not engage in the conduct that is charged as the offense against him; yet favorable answers to any of them will mean that he is legally innocent. Wherever the competence to make adequate factual determination lies, it is apparent that only a tribunal that is aware of these guilt-defeating doctrines and is willing to apply them can be viewed as competent to make determinations of legal guilt. The police and the prosecutors are ruled out by lack of competence, in the first instance, and by lack of assurance of willingness, in the second. Only an impartial tribunal can be trusted to make determinations of legal as opposed to factual guilt.

In this concept of legal guilt lies the explanation for the apparently quixotic presumption of innocence of which we spoke earlier. A man who, after police investigation, is charged with having committed a crime can hardly be said to be presumptively innocent, if what we mean is factual innocence. But if what we mean is that it has yet to be determined if any of the myriad legal doctrines that serve in one way or another the end of limiting official power through the observance of certain substantive and procedural regularities may be appropriately invoked to exculpate the accused man, it is apparent that as a matter of prediction it cannot be said with confidence that more probably than not he will be found guilty.
Beyond the question of predictability this model posits a functional reason for observing the presumption of innocence: by forcing the state to prove its case against the accused in an adjudicative context, the presumption of innocence serves to force into play all the qualifying and disabling doctrines that limit the use of the criminal sanction against the individual, thereby enhancing his opportunity to secure a favorable outcome. In this sense, the presumption of innocence may be seen to operate as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. By opening up a procedural situation that permits the successful assertion of defenses having nothing to do with factual guilt, it vindicates the proposition that the factually guilty may nonetheless be legally innocent and should therefore be given a chance to qualify for that kind of treatment.

The possibility of legal innocence is expanded enormously when the criminal process is viewed as the appropriate forum for correcting its own abuses. This notion may well account for a greater amount of the distance between the two models than any other. In theory the Crime Control Model can tolerate rules that forbid illegal arrests, unreasonable searches, coercive interrogations, and the like. What it cannot tolerate is the vindication of those rules in the criminal process itself through the exclusion of evidence illegally obtained or through the reversal of convictions in cases where the criminal process has breached the rules laid down for its observance. And the Due Process Model, although it may in the first instance be addressed to the maintenance of reliable fact-finding techniques, comes eventually to incorporate prophylactic and deterrent rules that result in the release of the factually guilty even in cases in which blotting out the illegality would still leave an adjudicative fact-finder convinced of the accused person's guilt. Only by penalizing errant police and prosecutors within the criminal process itself can adequate pressure be maintained, so the argument runs, to induce conformity with the Due Process Model.
Another strand in the complex of attitudes underlying the Due Process Model is the idea—itself a shorthand statement for a complex of attitudes-of equality. This notion has only recently emerged as an explicit basis for pressing the demands of the Due Process Model, but it appears to represent, at least in its potential, a most powerful norm for influencing official conduct. Stated most starkly, the ideal of equality holds that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” The factual predicate underlying this assertion is that there are gross inequalities in the financial means of criminal defendants as a class, that in an adversary system of criminal justice an effective defense is largely a function of the resources that can be mustered on behalf of the accused, and that the very large proportion of criminal defendants who are, operationally speaking, “indigent” will thus be denied an effective defense. This factual premise has been strongly reinforced by recent studies that in turn have been both a cause and an effect of an increasing emphasis upon norms for the criminal process based on the premise.

The norms derived from the premise do not take the form of an insistence upon governmental responsibility to provide literally equal opportunities for all criminal defendants to challenge the process. Rather, they take as their point of departure the notion that the criminal process, initiated as it is by the government and containing as it does the likelihood of severe deprivations at the hands of government, imposes some kind of public obligation to ensure that financial inability does not destroy the capacity of an accused to assert what may be meritorious challenges to the processes being invoked against him. At its most gross, the norm of equality would act to prevent situations in which financial inability forms an absolute barrier to the assertion of a right that is in theory generally available, as where there is a right to appeal that is, however, effectively conditional upon the filing of a trial transcript obtained at the defendant’s expense. Beyond this, it may provide the basis for a claim whenever the system theoretically makes some kind of challenge available to an accused who has the means to press it. If, for example, a defendant who is adequately represented has the opportunity to prevent the case against him from coming to the trial stage by forcing the state to its proof in a preliminary hearing, the norm of equality may be invoked to assert that the same kind of opportunity must be available to others as well. In a sense the system, as it functions for the small minority whose resources permit them to exploit all its defensive possibilities, provides a benchmark by which its functioning in all other cases is to be tested: not, perhaps, to guarantee literal identity but rather to provide a measure of whether the process as a whole is recognizably of the same general order. The demands made by a norm of this kind are likely by their very nature to be quite sweeping. Although the norm's imperatives may be initially limited to determining whether in a particular case the accused was injured or prejudiced by his relative inability to make an appropriate challenge, the norm of equality very quickly moves to another level on which the demand is that the process in general be adapted to minimize discriminations rather than that a mere series of post hoc determinations of discriminations be made or makeable.

It should be observed that the impact of the equality norm will vary greatly depending upon the point in time at which it is introduced into a model of the criminal process. If one were starting from scratch to decide how the process ought to work, the norm of equality would have nothing very important to say on such questions as, for example, whether an accused should have the effective assistance of counsel in deciding whether to enter a plea of guilty. One could decide, on quite independent considerations, that it is or is not a good thing to afford that facility to the generality of persons accused of crime. But the impact of the equality norm becomes far greater when it is brought to bear on a process whose contours have already been shaped. If our model of the criminal process affords defendants who are in a financial position to do so the right to consult a lawyer before entering a plea, then the equality norm exerts powerful pressure to provide such an opportunity to all defendants and to regard the failure to do so as a malfunctioning of the process of whose consequences the accused is entitled to be relieved. In a sense, this has been the role of the equality norm in affecting the real-world criminal process. It has made its appearance on the scene comparatively late and has therefore encountered a system in which the relative financial inability of most persons accused of crime results in treatment very different from that accorded the small minority of the financially capable. For this reason, its impact has already been substantial and may be expected to be even more so in the future.
There is a final strand of thought in the Due Process Model that is often ignored but that needs to be candidly faced if thought on the subject is not to be obscured. This is a mood of skepticism about the morality and utility of the criminal sanction, taken either as a whole or in some of its applications. The subject is a large and complicated one, comprehending as it does much of the intellectual history of our times. It is properly the subject of another essay altogether. To put the matter briefly, one cannot improve upon the statement by Professor Paul Bator:

In summary we are told that the criminal law's notion of just condemnation and punishment is a cruel hypocrisy visited by a smug society on the psychologically and economically crippled; that its premise of a morally autonomous will with at least some measure of choice whether to comply with the values expressed in a penal code is unscientific and outmoded; that its reliance on punishment as an educational and deterrent agent is misplaced, particularly in the case of the very members of society most likely to engage in criminal conduct; and that its failure to provide for individualized and humane rehabilitation of offenders is inhuman and wasteful. 1

This skepticism, which may be fairly said to be widespread among the most influential and articulate contemporary leaders of informed opinion, leads to an attitude toward the processes of the criminal law that, to quote Mr. Bator again, engenders “a peculiar receptivity toward claims of injustice which arise within the traditional structure of the system itself, fundamental disagreement and unease about the very bases of the criminal law has, inevitably, created acute pressure at least to expand and liberalize those of its processes and doctrines which serve to make more tentative its judgments or limit its power.” In short, doubts about the ends for which power is being exercised create pressure to limit the discretion with which that power is exercised.

The point need not be pressed to the extreme of doubts about or rejection of the premises upon which the criminal sanction in general rests. Unease may be stirred simply by reflection on the variety of uses to which the criminal sanction is put and by a judgment that an increasingly large proportion of those uses may represent an unwise invocation of so extreme a sanction. It would be an interesting irony if doubts about the propriety of certain uses of the criminal sanction prove to contribute to a restrictive trend in the criminal process that in the end requires a choice among uses and. finally an abandonment of some of the very uses that stirred the original doubts, but for a reason quite unrelated to those doubts.
There are two kinds of problems that need to be dealt with in any model of the criminal process. One is what the rules shall be. The other is how the rules shall be implemented. The second is at least as important as the first, as we shall see time and again in our detailed development of the models. The distinctive difference between the two models is not only in the rules of conduct that they lay down but also in the sanctions that are to be invoked when a claim is presented that the rules have been breached and, no less importantly, in the timing that is permitted or required for the invocation of those sanctions.

As I have already suggested, the Due Process Model locates at least some of the sanctions for breach of the operative rules in the criminal process itself. The relation between these two aspects of the process—the rules and the sanctions for their breach—is a purely formal one unless there is some mechanism for bringing them into play with each other. The hinge between them in the Due Process Model is the availability of legal counsel. This has a double aspect. Many of the rules that the model requires are couched in terms of the availability of counsel to do various things at various stages of the process—this is the conventionally recognized aspect; beyond it, there is a pervasive assumption that counsel is necessary in order to invoke sanctions for breach of any of the rules. The more freely available these sanctions are, the more important is the role of counsel in seeing to it that the sanctions are appropriately invoked. If the process is seen as a series of occasions for checking its own operation, the role of counsel is a much more nearly central one than is the case in a process that is seen as primarily concerned with expeditious determination of factual guilt. And if equality of operation is a governing norm, the availability of counsel is seen as requiring it for all. Of all the controverted aspects of the criminal process, the right to counsel, including the role of government in its provision, is the most dependent on what one’s model of the process looks like, and the least susceptible of resolution unless one has confronted the antinomies of the two models.

I do not mean to suggest that questions about the right to counsel disappear if one adopts a model of the process that conforms more or less closely to the Crime Control Model, but only that such questions become absolutely central if one’s model moves very far down the spectrum of possibilities toward the pure Due Process Model. The reason for this centrality is to be found in the assumption underlying both models that the process is an adversary one in which the initiative in invoking relevant rules rests primarily on the parties concerned, the state, and the accused. One could construct models that placed central responsibility on adjudicative agents such as committing magistrates and trial judges. And there are, as we shall see, marginal but nonetheless important adjustments in the role of the adjudicative agents that enter into the models with which we are concerned. For present purposes it is enough to say that these adjustments are marginal, that the animating presuppositions that underlie both models in the context of the American criminal system relegate the adjudicative agents to a relatively passive role, and therefore place central importance on the role of counsel.

One last introductory note: . . . What assumptions do we make about the sources of authority to shape the real-world operations of the criminal process? Recognizing that our models are only models, what agencies of government have the power to pick and choose between their competing demands? Once again, the limiting features of the American context come into play. Ours is not a system of legislative supremacy. The distinctively American institution of judicial review exercises a limiting and ultimately a shaping influence on the criminal process. Because the Crime Control Model is basically an affirmative model, emphasizing at every turn the existence and exercise of official power, its validating authority is ultimately legislative (although proximately administrative). Because the Due Process Model is basically a negative model, asserting limits on the nature of official power and on the modes of its exercise, its validating authority is judicial and requires an appeal to supralegislative law, to the law of the Constitution. To the extent that tensions between the two models are resolved by deference to the Due Process Model, the authoritative force at work is the judicial power, working in the distinctively judicial mode of invoking the sanction of nullity. That is at once the strength and the weakness of the Due Process Model: its strength because in our system the appeal to the Constitution provides the last and overriding word; its weakness because saying no in specific cases is an exercise in futility unless there is a general willingness on the part of the officials who operate the process to apply negative prescriptions across the board. It is no accident that statements reinforcing the Due Process Model come from the courts, while at the same time facts denying it are established by the police and prosecutors.

NOTE

1. Paul Bator, “Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,” Harvard Law Review 76 (1963): 441-442.

Source: Reprinted by http://www.hhs.csus.edu
from The Limits of the Criminal Sanction by Herbert L. Packer, with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press.  1968 by Herbert L. Packer.

Two Models of the Criminal Process ( I )

2007-06-28T03:16:00.000-07:00

by
HERBERT L. PACKER

In one of the most important contributions to systematic thought about the administration of criminal justice, Herbert Packer articulates the values supporting two models of the justice process. He notes the gulf existing between the "Due Process Model" of criminal administration, with its emphasis on the rights of the individual, and the "Crime Control Model," which sees the regulation of criminal conduct as the most important function of the judicial system.

Two models of the criminal process will let us perceive the normative antinomy at the heart of the criminal law. These models are not labeled Is and Ought, nor are they to be taken in that sense. Rather, they represent an attempt to abstract two separate value systems that compete for priority in the operation of the criminal process. Neither is presented as either corresponding to reality or representing the ideal to the exclusion of the other. The two models merely afford a convenient way to talk about the operation of a process whose day-to-day functioning involves a constant series of minute adjustments between the competing demands of two value systems and whose normative future likewise involves a series of resolutions of the tensions between competing claims.

I call these two models the Due Process Model and the Crime Control Model. . . . As we examine the way the models operate in each successive stage, we will raise two further inquiries: first, where on a spectrum between the extremes represented by the two models do our present practices seem approximately to fall; second, what appears to be the direction and thrust of current and foreseeable trends along each such spectrum?

There is a risk in an enterprise of this sort that is latent in any attempt to polarize. It is, simply, that values are too various to be pinned down to yes-or-no answers. The models are distortions of reality. And, since they are normative in character, there is a danger of seeing one or the other as Good or Bad. The reader will have his preferences, as I do, but we should not be so rigid as to demand consistently polarized answers to the range of questions posed in the criminal process. The weighty questions of public policy that inhere in any attempt to discern where on the spectrum of normative choice the “right” answer lies are beyond the scope of the present inquiry. The attempt here is primarily to clarify the terms of discussion by isolating the assumptions that underlie competing policy claims, and examining the conclusions that those claims, if fully accepted, would lead to.

VALUES UNDERLYING THE MODELS

Each of the two models we are about to examine is an attempt to give operational content to a complex of values underlying the criminal law. As I have suggested earlier, it is possible to identify two competing systems of values, the tension between which accounts for the intense activity now observable in the development of the criminal process. The actors in this development—lawmakers, judges, police, prosecutors, defense lawyers—do not often pause to articulate the values that underlie the positions that they take on any given issue. Indeed, it would be a gross oversimplification to ascribe a coherent and consistent set of values to any of these actors. Each of the two competing schemes of values we will be developing in this section contains components that are demonstrably present some of the time in some of the actors’ preferences regarding the criminal process. No one person has ever identified himself as holding all of the values that underlie these two models. The models are polarities, and so are the schemes of values that underlie them. A person who subscribed to all of the values underlying the other would be rightly viewed as a fanatic. The values are presented here as an aid to analysis, not as a program for action.

Some Common Ground

However, the polarity of the two models is not absolute. Although it would be possible to construct models that exist in an institutional vacuum, it would not serve our purposes to do so. We are postulating, not a criminal process that operates in any kind of society at all, but rather one that operates within the framework of contemporary American society. This leaves plenty of room for polarization, but it does require the observance of some limits. A model of the criminal process that left out of account relatively stable and enduring features of the American legal system would not have much relevance to our central inquiry. For convenience, these elements of stability and continuity can be roughly equated with minimal agreed limits expressed in the Constitution of the United States and, more importantly, with unarticulated assumptions that can be perceived to underlie those limits. Of course, it is true that the Constitution is constantly appealed to by proponents and opponents of many measures that affect the criminal process. And only the naive would deny that there are few conclusive positions that can be reached by appeal to the Constitution. Yet there are assumptions about the criminal process that are widely shared and that may be viewed as common ground for the operation of any model of the criminal process. Our first task is to clarify these assumptions.

First, there is the assumption, implicit in the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, that the function of defining conduct that may be treated as criminal is separate from and prior to the process of identifying and dealing with persons as criminals. How wide or narrow the definition of criminal conduct must be is an important question of policy that yields highly variable results depending on the values held by those making the relevant decisions. But that there must be a means of definition that is in some sense separate from and prior to the operation of the process is clear. If this were not so, our efforts to deal with the phenomenon of organized crime would appear ludicrous indeed (which is not to say that we have by any means exhausted the possibilities for dealing with that problem within the limits of this basic assumption).

A related assumption that limits the area of controversy is that the criminal process ordinarily ought to be invoked by those charged with the responsibility for doing so when it appears that a crime has been committed and that there is a reasonable prospect of apprehending and convicting its perpetrator. Although police and prosecutors are allowed broad discretion for deciding not to invoke the criminal process, it is commonly agreed that these officials have no general dispensing power. If the legislature has decided that certain conduct is to be treated as criminal, the decision makers at every level of the criminal process are expected to accept that basic decision as a premise for action. The controversial nature of the occasional case in which the relevant decision makers appear not to have played their appointed role only serves to highlight the strength with which the premise holds. This assumption may be viewed as the other side of the ex post facto coin. Just as conduct that is not proscribed as criminal may not be dealt with in the criminal process, so conduct that has been denominated as criminal must be treated as such by the participants in the criminal process acting within their respective competences.

Next, there is the assumption that there are limits to the powers of government to investigate and apprehend persons suspected of committing crimes. I do not refer to the controversy (settled recently, at least in broad outline) as to whether the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to the states with the same force with which it applies to the federal government. Rather, I am talking about the general assumption that a degree of scrutiny and control must be exercised with respect to the activities of law enforcement officers, that the security and privacy of the individual may not be invaded at will. It is possible to imagine a society in which even lip service is not paid to this assumption. Nazi Germany approached but never quite reached this position. But no one in our society would maintain that any individual may be taken into custody at any time and held without any limitation of time during the process of investigating his possible commission of crimes, or would argue that there should be no form of redress for violation of at least some standards for official investigative conduct. Although this assumption may not appear to have much in the way of positive content, its absence would render moot some of our most hotly controverted problems. If there were not general agreement that there must be some limits on police power to detain and investigate, the highly controversial provisions of the Uniform Arrest Act, permitting the police to detain a person for questioning for a short period even though they do not have grounds for making an arrest; would be a magnanimous concession by the all-powerful state rather than, as it is now perceived, a substantial expansion of police power.

Finally, there is a complex of assumptions embraced by terms such as “the adversary system,” “procedural due process,” “notice and an opportunity to be heard,” and “day in court.” Common to them all is the notion that the alleged criminal is not merely an object to be acted upon but an independent entity in the process who may, if he so desires, force the operators of the process to demonstrate to an independent authority (judge and jury) that he is guilty of the charges against him. It is a minimal assumption. It speaks in terms of “may” rather than “must.” It permits but does not require the accused, acting by himself or through his own agent, to play an active role in the process. By virtue of that fact the process becomes or has the capacity to become a contest between, if not equals, at least independent actors. As we shall see, much of the space between the two models is occupied by stronger or weaker notions of how this contest is to be arranged, in what cases it is to be played, and by what rules. The Crime Control Model tends to de-emphasize this adversary aspect of the process; the Due Process Model tends to make it central. The common ground, and it is important, is the agreement that the process has, for everyone subjected to it, at least the potentiality of becoming to some extent an adversary struggle.

So much for common ground. There is a good deal of it, even in the narrowest view. Its existence should not be overlooked, because it is, by definition, what permits partial resolutions of the tension between the two models to take place. The rhetoric of the criminal process consists largely of claims that disputed territory is "really" common ground: that, for example, the premise of an adversary system "necessarily" embraces the appointment of counsel for everyone accused of crime, or conversely, that the obligation to pursue persons suspected of commuting crimes "necessarily" embraces interrogation of suspects without the intervention of counsel. We may smile indulgently at such claims; they are rhetoric, and no more. But the form in which they are made suggests an important truth: that there is a common ground of value assumption about the criminal process that makes continued discourse about its problems possible.

Crime Control Values

Crime Control Values

The value system that underlies the Crime Control Model is based on the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by the criminal process. The failure of law enforcement to bring criminal conduct under tight control is viewed as leading to the breakdown of public order and thence to the disappearance of an important condition of human freedom. If the laws go unenforced—which is to say, if it is perceived that there is a high percentage of failure to apprehend and convict in the criminal process—a general disregard for legal controls tends to develop. The law-abiding citizen then becomes the victim of all sorts of unjustifiable invasions of his interests. His security of person and property is sharply diminished, and, therefore, so is his liberty to function as a member of society. The claim ultimately is that the criminal process is a positive guarantor of social freedom. In order to achieve this high purpose, the Crime Control Model requires that primary attention be paid to the efficiency with which the criminal process operates to screen suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate dispositions of persons convicted of crime.
Efficiency of operation is not, of course, a criterion that can be applied in a vacuum. By “efficiency” we mean the system's capacity to apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose offenses become known. In a society in which only the grossest forms of antisocial behavior were made criminal and in which the crime rate was exceedingly low, the criminal process might require the devotion of many more man-hours of police, prosecutorial, and judicial time per case than ours does, and still operate with tolerable efficiency. A society that was prepared to increase even further the resources devoted to the suppression of crime might cope with a rising crime rate without sacrifice of efficiency while continuing to maintain an elaborate and time-consuming set of criminal processes. However, neither of these possible characteristics corresponds with social reality in this country. We use the criminal sanction to cover an increasingly wide spectrum of behavior thought to be antisocial, and the amount of crime is very high indeed, although both level and trend are hard to assess. At the same time, although precise measures are not available, it does not appear that we are disposed in the public sector of the economy to increase very drastically the quantity, much less the quality, of the resources devoted to the suppression of criminal activity through the operation of the criminal process. These factors have an important bearing on the criterion of efficiency, and therefore on the nature of the Crime Control Model.
The model, in order to operate successfully, must produce a high rate of apprehension and conviction, and must do so in a context where the magnitudes being dealt with are very large and the resources for dealing with them are very limited. There must then be a premium on speed and finality. Speed, in turn, depends on informality and on uniformity; finality depends on minimizing the occasions for challenge. The process must not be cluttered up with ceremonious rituals that do not advance the progress of a case. Facts can be established more quickly through interrogation in a police station than through the formal process of examination and cross-examination in a court. It follows that extrajudicial processes should be preferred to judicial processes, informal operations to formal ones. But informality is not enough; there must also be uniformity. Routine, stereotyped procedures are essential if large numbers are being handled. The model that will operate successfully on these presuppositions must be an administrative, almost a managerial, model. The image that comes to mind is an assembly-line conveyor belt down which moves an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers who stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the same small but essential operation that brings it one step closer to being a finished product, or, to exchange the metaphor for the reality, a closed file. The criminal process, in this model, is seen as a screening process in which each successive state—prearrest investigation, arrest, postarrest investigation, preparation for trial, trial or entry of plea, conviction, disposition—involves a series of routinized operations whose success is gauged primarily by their tendency to pass the case along to a successful conclusion.
What is a successful conclusion? One that throws off at an early stage those cases in which it appears unlikely that the person apprehended is an offender and then secures, as expeditiously as possible, the conviction of the rest, with a minimum of occasions for challenge, let alone post-audit. By the application of administrative expertness, primarily that of the police and prosecutors, an early determination of the probability of innocence or guilt emerges. Those who are probably innocent are screened out. Those who are probably guilty are passed quickly through the remaining stages of the process. The key to the operation of the model regarding those who are not screened out is what I shall call a presumption of guilt. The concept requires some explanation, since it may appear startling to assert that what appears to be the precise converse of our generally accepted ideology of a presumption of innocence can be an essential element of a model that does correspond in some respects to the actual operation of the criminal process.
The presumption of guilt is what makes it possible for the system to deal efficiently with large numbers, as the Crime Control Model demands. The supposition is that the screening processes operated by police and prosecutors are reliable indicators of probable guilt. Once a man has been arrested and investigated without being found to be probably innocent, or, to put it differently, once a determination has been made that here is enough evidence of guilt to permit holding him for further action, then all subsequent activity directed toward him is based on the view that he is probably guilty. The precise point at which this occurs will vary from case to case; in many cases it will occur as soon as the suspect is arrested, or even before, if the evidence of probable guilt that has come to the attention of the authorities is sufficiently strong. But in any case the presumption of guilt will begin to operate well before the “suspect” becomes a “defendant.”
The presumption of guilt is not, of course, a thing. Nor is it even a rule of law in the usual sense. It simply is the consequence of a complex of attitudes, a mood. If there is confidence in the reliability of informal administrative fact-finding activities that take place in the early stages of the criminal process, the remaining stages of the process can be relatively perfunctory without any loss in operating efficiency. The presumption of guilt, as it operates in the Crime Control Model, is the operational expression of that confidence.
It would be a mistake to think of the presumption of guilt as the opposite of the presumption of innocence that we are so used to thinking of as the polestar of the criminal process and that, as we shall see, occupies an important position in the Due Process Model. The presumption of innocence is not its opposite; it is irrelevant to the presumption of guilt; the two concepts are different rather than opposite ideas. The difference can perhaps be epitomized by an example. A murderer, for reasons best known to himself, chooses to shoot his victim in plain view of a large number of people. When the police arrive, he hands them his gun and says, “I did it and I'm glad.” His account of what happened is corroborated by several eyewitnesses. He is placed under arrest and led off to jail. Under these circumstances, which may seem extreme but which in fact characterize with rough accuracy the evidentiary situation in a large proportion of criminal cases, it would be plainly absurd to maintain that more probably than not the suspect did not commit the killing. But that is not what the presumption of innocence means. It means that until there has been an adjudication of guilt by an authority legally competent to make such an adjudication, the suspect is to be treated, for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the probable outcome of the case, as if his guilt is an open question.
The presumption of innocence is a direction to officials about how they are to proceed, not a prediction of outcome. The presumption of guilt, however, is purely and simply a prediction of outcome. The presumption of innocence is, then, a direction to the authorities to ignore the presumption of guilt in their treatment of the suspect. It tells them, in effect, to close their eyes to what will frequently seem to be factual probabilities. The reasons why it tells them this are among the animating presuppositions of the Due Process Model, and we will come to them shortly. It is enough to note at this point that the presumption of guilt is descriptive and factual; the presumption of innocence is normative and legal. The pure Crime Control Model has no truck with the presumption of innocence, although its real-life emanations are, as we shall see, brought into uneasy compromise with the dictates of this dominant ideological position. In the presumption of guilt this model finds a factual predicate for the position that the dominant goal of repressing crime can be achieved through highly summary processes without any great loss of efficiency (as previously defined), because of the probability that, in the run of cases, the preliminary screening process operated by the police and the prosecuting officials contains adequate guarantees of reliable fact-finding. Indeed, the model takes an even stronger position. It is that subsequent processes, particularly those of a formal adjudicatory nature, are unlikely to produce as reliable fact-finding as the expert administrative process that precedes them is capable of. The criminal process thus must put special weight on the quality of administrative fact-finding. It becomes important, then, to place as few restrictions as possible on the character of the administrative fact-finding processes and to limit restrictions to such as enhance reliability, excluding those designed for other purposes. As we shall see, this view of restrictions on administrative fact-finding is a consistent theme in the development of the Crime Control Model.
In this model, as I have suggested, the center of gravity of the process lies in the early, administrative fact-finding stages. The complementary proposition is that the subsequent stages are relatively unimportant and should be truncated as much as possible. This, too, produces tensions with presently dominant ideology. The pure Crime Control Model has very little use for many conspicuous features of the adjudicative process, and in real life works out a number of ingenious compromises with them. Even in the pure model, however, there have to be devices for dealing with the suspect after the preliminary screening process has resulted in a determination of probable guilt. The focal device, as we shall see, is the plea of guilty; through its use, adjudicative fact-finding is reduced to its barest essentials and operating at its most successful pitch, it offers two possibilities: an administrative fact-finding process leading (1) to exoneration of the suspect, or (2) to the entry of a plea of guilty.

Due Process Values
.......... Part II

Source: Reprinted from The Limits of the Criminal Sanction by Herbert L. Packer, with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press.  1968 by Herbert L. Packer. Published by http://www.hhs.csus.edu

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (American Version)

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2001 Report on Foreign Terrorist Organizations
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
October 5, 2001

Background

The Secretary of State designates Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO’s), in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury. These designations are undertaken pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. FTO designations are valid for two years, after which they must be redesignated or they automatically expire. Redesignation after two years is a positive act and represents a determination by the Secretary of State that the organization has continued to engage in terrorist activity and still meets the criteria specified in law.

* In October 1997, former Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright approved the designation of the first 30 groups as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
* In October 1999, Secretary Albright re-certified 27 of these groups’ designations but allowed three organizations to drop from the list because their involvement in terrorist activity had ended and they no longer met the criteria for designation.
* Secretary Albright designated one new FTO in 1999 (al Qa’ida) and another in 2000 (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).
* Secretary of State Colin L. Powell has designated two new FTO’s (Real IRA and AUC) in 2001.
* In October 2001, Secretary Powell re-certified the designation of 26 of the 28 FTO’s whose designation was due to expire, and combined two previously designated groups (Kahane Chai and Kach) into one.

Current List of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations (as of October 5, 2001)
1. Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
2. Abu Sayyaf Group
3. Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
4. Aum Shinrikyo
5. Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
6. Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group)
7. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
8. Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM)
9. Hizballah (Party of God)
10. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
11. al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad)
12. Kahane Chai (Kach)
13. Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
14. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
15. Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)
16. National Liberation Army (ELN)
17. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
18. Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
19. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
20. PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC)
21. al-Qa'ida
22. Real IRA
23. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
24. Revolutionary Nuclei (formerly ELA)
25. Revolutionary Organization 17 November
26. Revolutionary People's Liberation Army/Front (DHKP/C)
27. Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL)
28. United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

NOTE: For descriptions of these foreign terrorist organizations, please refer to "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2000."

Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology

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First U.S. Aircraft Hijacked, May 1, 1961: Puerto Rican born Antuilo Ramierez Ortiz forced at gunpoint a National Airlines plane to fly to Havana, Cuba, where he was given asylum.

Ambassador to Guatemala Assassinated, August 28, 1968: U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John Gordon Mein was murdered by a rebel faction when gunmen forced his official car off the road in Guatemala City and raked the vehicle with gunfire.

Ambassador to Japan Attacked, July 30, 1969: U.S. Ambassador to Japan A.H. Meyer was attacked by a knife-wielding Japanese citizen.

Ambassador to Brazil Kidnapped, September 3, 1969: U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick was kidnapped by the Marxist revolutionary group MR-8.

Attack on the Munich Airport, February 10, 1970: Three terrorists attacked El Al passengers in a bus at the Munich Airport with guns and grenades. One passenger was killed and 11 were injured. All three terrorists were captured by airport police. The Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack.

U.S. Agency for International Development Adviser Kidnapped, July 31, 1970: In Montevideo, Uruguay, the Tupamaros terrorist group kidnapped AID Police adviser Dan Mitrione; his body was found on August 10.

"Bloody Friday," July 21, 1972: An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb attacks killed eleven people and injure 130 in Belfast, Northern Ireland. Ten days later, three IRA car bomb attacks in the village of Claudy left six dead.

Munich Olympic Massacre, September 5, 1972: Eight Palestinian "Black September" terrorists seized eleven Israeli athletes in the Olympic Village in Munich, West Germany. In a bungled rescue attempt by West German authorities, nine of the hostages and five terrorists were killed.

Ambassador to Sudan Assassinated, March 2, 1973: U.S. Ambassador to Sudan Cleo A. Noel and other diplomats were assassinated at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum by members of the Black September organization.

Consul General in Mexico Kidnapped, May 4, 1973: U.S. Consul General in Guadalajara Terrence Leonhardy was kidnapped by members of the People’s Revolutionary Armed Forces.

Attack and Hijacking at the Rome Airport, December 17, 1973: Five terrorists pulled weapons from their luggage in the terminal lounge at the Rome airport, killing two persons. They then attacked a Pan American 707 bound for Beirut and Tehran, destroying it with incendiary grenades and killing 29 persons, including 4 senior Moroccan officials and 14 American employees of ARAMCO. They then herded 5 Italian hostages into a Lufthansa airliner and killed an Italian customs agent as he tried to escape, after which they forced the pilot to fly to Beirut. After Lebanese authorities refused to let the plane land, it landed in Athens, where the terrorists demanded the release of 2 Arab terrorists. In order to make Greek authorities comply with their demands, the terrorists killed a hostage and threw his body onto the tarmac. The plane then flew to Damascus, where it stopped for two hours to obtain fuel and food. It then flew to Kuwait, where the terrorists released their hostages in return for passage to an unknown destination. The Palestine Liberation Organization disavowed the attack, and no group claimed responsibility for it.

Ambassador to Cyprus Assassinated, August 19, 1974: U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger P. Davies and his Greek Cypriot secretary were shot and killed by snipers during a demonstration outside the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia.

Domestic Terrorism, January 27-29, 1975: Puerto Rican nationalists bombed a Wall Street bar, killing four and injuring 60; two days later, the Weather Underground claims responsibility for an explosion in a bathroom at the U.S. Department of State in Washington.

June 16, 1976: Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr. and Economic Counselor Robert O. Waring were kidnapped in Beirut while on their way to meet with President-elect Sarkis. Meloy, Waring, and their Lebanese chauffeur were found dead near a beach several hours alter. No demands were made, and the assassins remain unknown.

Entebbe Hostage Crisis, June 27, 1976: Members of the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an Air France airliner and its 258 passengers. They forced the plane to land in Uganda. On July 3 Israeli commandos successfully rescued the passengers.

Assassination of Former Chilean Diplomat, September 21, 1976: Exiled Chilean Foreign Minister Orlando Letelier was killed by a car-bomb in Washington.

Kidnapping of Italian Prime Minister, March 16, 1978: Premier Aldo Moro was seized by the Red Brigade and assassinated 55 days later.

Ambassador to Afghanistan Assassinated, February 14, 1979: Four Afghans kidnapped U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs in Kabul and demanded the release of various "religious figures." Dubs was killed, along with four alleged terrorists, when Afghan police stormed the hotel room where he was being held.

Iran Hostage Crisis, November 4, 1979: After President Carter agreed to admit the Shah of Iran into the US, Iranian radicals seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American diplomats hostage. Thirteen hostages were soon released, but the remaining 53 were held until their release on January 20, 1981.

Grand Mosque Seizure, November 20, 1979: 200 Islamic terrorists seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, taking hundreds of pilgrims hostage. Saudi and French security forces retook the shrine after an intense battle in which some 250 people were killed and 600 wounded.

August 27, 1980: Unknown assailants in Beirut fired on Ambassador John Gunther Dean's car. He and his party escaped unharmed.

U.S. Installation Bombing, August 31, 1981: The Red Army exploded a bomb at the U.S. Air Force Base at Ramstein, West Germany.

Assassination of Egyptian President, October 6, 1981: Soldiers who were secretly members of the Takfir Wal-Hajira sect attacked and killed Egyptian President Anwar Sadat during a troop review.

Murder of Missionaries, December 4, 1981: Three American nuns and one lay missionary were found murdered outside San Salvador, El Salvador. They were killed by members of the National Guard, and the killers are currently in prison.

Assassination of Lebanese President, September 14, 1982: President Bashir Gemayel was assassinated by a car bomb parked outside his party’s Beirut headquarters.

1983

Colombian Hostage-taking, April 8, 1983: A U.S. citizen was seized by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and held for ransom.

Bombing of U.S. Embassy in Beirut, April 18, 1983: Sixty-three people, including the CIA’s Middle East director, were killed and 120 were injured in a 400-pound suicide truck-bomb attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Naval Officer Assassinated in El Salvador, May 25, 1983: A U.S. Navy officer was assassinated by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front.

North Korean Hit Squad, October 9, 1983: North Korean agents blew up a delegation from South Korea in Rangoon, Burma, killing 21 persons and injuring 48.

Bombing of Marine Barracks, Beirut, October 23, 1983: Simultaneous suicide truck-bomb attacks were made on American and French compounds in Beirut, Lebanon. A 12,000-pound bomb destroyed the U.S. compound, killing 242 Americans, while 58 French troops were killed when a 400-pound device destroyed a French base. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Naval Officer Assassinated in Greece, November 15, 1983: A U.S. Navy officer was shot by the November 17 terrorist group in Athens, Greece, while his car was stopped at a traffic light.

1984

Kidnapping of Embassy Official, March 16, 1984: The Islamic Jihad kidnapped and later murdered Political Officer William Buckley in Beirut, Lebanon. Other U.S. citizens not connected to the U.S. government were seized over a succeeding two-year period.

Restaurant Bombing in Spain, April 12, 1984: Eighteen U.S. servicemen were killed and 83 people were injured in a bomb attack on a restaurant near a U.S. Air Force Base in Torrejon, Spain.

Temple Seizure, June 5, 1984: Sikh terrorists seized the Golden Temple in Amritsar, India. One hundred people died when Indian security forces retook the Sikh holy shrine.

Assassination of Indian Prime Minister, October 31, 1984: Premier Indira Gandhi was shot to death by members of her security force.

1985

Kidnapping of U.S. Officials in Mexico, February 7, 1985: Under the orders of narcotrafficker Rafael Caro Quintero, Drug Enforcement Administration agent Enrique Camarena Salazar and his pilot were kidnapped, tortured and executed.

TWA Hijacking, June 14, 1985: A Trans-World Airlines flight was hijacked en route to Rome from Athens by two Lebanese Hizballah terrorists and forced to fly to Beirut. The eight crew members and 145 passengers were held for seventeen days, during which one American hostage, a U.S. Navy sailor, was murdered. After being flown twice to Algiers, the aircraft was returned to Beirut after Israel released 435 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners.

Attack on a Restaurant in El Salvador, June 19, 1985: Members of the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) fired on a restaurant in the Zona Rosa district of San Salvador, killing four Marine Security Guards assigned to the U.S. Embassy and nine Salvadorean civilians.

Air India Bombing, June 23, 1985: A bomb destroyed an Air India Boeing 747 over the Atlantic, killing all 329 people aboard. Both Sikh and Kashmiri terrorists were blamed for the attack. Two cargo handlers were killed at Tokyo airport, Japan, when another Sikh bomb exploded in an Air Canada aircraft en route to India.

Soviet Diplomats Kidnapped, September 30, 1985: In Beirut, Lebanon, Sunni terrorists kidnapped four Soviet diplomats. One was killed but three were later released.

Achille Lauro Hijacking, October 7, 1985: Four Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists seized the Italian cruise liner in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, taking more than 700 hostages. One U.S. passenger was murdered before the Egyptian government offered the terrorists safe haven in return for the hostages’ freedom.

Egyptian Airliner Hijacking, November 23, 1985: An EgyptAir airplane bound from Athens to Malta and carrying several U.S. citizens was hijacked by the Abu Nidal Group.

Airport Attacks in Rome and Vienna, December 27, 1985: Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization attacked the El Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at Rome’s Leonardo da Vinci Airport with grenades and automatic rifles. Thirteen persons were killed and 75 were wounded before Italian police and Israeli security guards killed three of the gunmen and captured the fourth. Three more Abu Nidal gunmen attacked the El Al ticket counter at Vienna’s Schwechat Airport, killing three persons and wounding 30. Austrian police killed one of the gunmen and captured the others.

1986

Aircraft Bombing in Greece, March 30, 1986: A Palestinian splinter group detonated a bomb as TWA Flight 840 approached Athens airport, killing four U.S. citizens.

Berlin Discothèque Bombing, April 5, 1986: Two U.S. soldiers were killed and 79 American servicemen were injured in a Libyan bomb attack on a nightclub in West Berlin, West Germany. In retaliation U.S. military jets bombed targets in and around Tripoli and Benghazi.

Kimpo Airport Bombing, September 14, 1986: North Korean agents detonated an explosive device at Seoul’s Kimpo airport, killing 5 persons and injuring 29 others.

1987

Bus Attack, April 24, 1987: Sixteen U.S. servicemen riding in a Greek Air Force bus near Athens were injured in an apparent bombing attack, carried out by the revolutionary organization known as November 17.

Downing of Airliner, November 29, 1987: North Korean agents planted a bomb aboard Korean Air Lines Flight 858, which subsequently crashed into the Indian Ocean.

Servicemen’s Bar Attack, December 26, 1987: Catalan separatists bombed a Barcelona bar frequented by U.S. servicemen, resulting in the death of one U.S. citizen.

1988

Kidnapping of William Higgins, February 17, 1988: U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel W. Higgins was kidnapped and murdered by the Iranian-backed Hizballah group while serving with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in southern Lebanon.

Naples USO Attack, April 14, 1988: The Organization of Jihad Brigades exploded a car-bomb outside a USO Club in Naples, Italy, killing one U.S. sailor.

Attack on U.S. Diplomat in Greece, June 28, 1988: The Defense Attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Greece was killed when a car-bomb was detonated outside his home in Athens.

Pan Am 103 Bombing, December 21, 1988: Pan American Airlines Flight 103 was blown up over Lockerbie, Scotland, by a bomb believed to have been placed on the aircraft by Libyan terrorists in Frankfurt, West Germany. All 259 people on board were killed.

1989

Assassination of U.S. Army Officer, April 21, 1989: The New People’s Army (NPA) assassinated Colonel James Rowe in Manila. The NPA also assassinated two U.S. government defense contractors in September.

Bombing of UTA Flight 772, September 19, 1989: A bomb explosion destroyed UTA Flight 772 over the Sahara Desert in southern Niger during a flight from Brazzaville to Paris. All 170 persons aboard were killed. Six Libyans were later found guilty in absentia and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Assassination of German Bank Chairman, November 30, 1989: The Red Army Faction assassinated Deutsche Bank Chairman Alfred Herrhausen in Frankfurt.

1990

U.S. Embassy Bombed in Peru, January 15, 1990: The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement bombed the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru.

U.S. Soldiers Assassinated in the Philippines, May 13, 1990: The New People’s Army (NPA) killed two U.S. Air Force personnel near Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines.

1991

Attempted Iraqi Attacks on U.S. Posts, January 18-19, 1991: Iraqi agents planted bombs at the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia’s home residence and at the USIS library in Manila.

Sniper Attack on the U.S. Embassy in Bonn, February 13, 1991: Three Red Army Faction members fired automatic rifles from across the Rhine River at the U.S. Embassy Chancery. No one was hurt.

Assassination of former Indian Prime Minister, May 21, 1991: A female member of the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) killed herself, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, and 16 others by detonating an explosive vest after presenting a garland of flowers to the former Prime Minister during an election rally in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

1992

Kidnapping of U.S. Businessmen in the Philippines, January 17-21, 1992: A senior official of the corporation Philippine Geothermal was kidnapped in Manila by the Red Scorpion Group, and two U.S. businessmen were seized independently by the National Liberation Army and by Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).

Bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina, March 17, 1992: Hizballah claimed responsibility for a blast that leveled the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, causing the deaths of 29 and wounding 242.

1993

Kidnappings of U.S. Citizens in Colombia, January 31, 1993: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) terrorists kidnapped three U.S. missionaries.

World Trade Center Bombing, February 26, 1993: The World Trade Center in New York City was badly damaged when a car bomb planted by Islamic terrorists exploded in an underground garage. The bomb left 6 people dead and 1,000 injured. The men carrying out the attack were followers of Umar Abd al-Rahman, an Egyptian cleric who preached in the New York City area.

Attempted Assassination of President Bush by Iraqi Agents, April 14, 1993: The Iraqi intelligence service attempted to assassinate former U.S. President George Bush during a visit to Kuwait. In retaliation, the U.S. launched a cruise missile attack 2 months later on the Iraqi capital Baghdad.

1994

Hebron Massacre, February 25, 1994: Jewish right-wing extremist and U.S. citizen Baruch Goldstein machine-gunned Moslem worshippers at a mosque in West Bank town of Hebron, killing 29 and wounding about 150.

FARC Hostage-taking, September 23, 1994: FARC rebels kidnapped U.S. citizen Thomas Hargrove in Colombia.

Air France Hijacking, December 24, 1994: Members of the Armed Islamic Group seized an Air France Flight to Algeria. The four terrorists were killed during a rescue effort.

1995

Attack on U.S. Diplomats in Pakistan, March 8, 1995: Two unidentified gunmen killed two U.S. diplomats and wounded a third in Karachi, Pakistan.

Tokyo Subway Station Attack, March 20, 1995: Twelve persons were killed and 5,700 were injured in a Sarin nerve gas attack on a crowded subway station in the center of Tokyo, Japan. A similar attack occurred nearly simultaneously in the Yokohama subway system. The Aum Shinri-kyo cult was blamed for the attacks.

Bombing of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, April 19, 1995: Right-wing extremists Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols destroyed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City with a massive truck bomb that killed 166 and injured hundreds more in what was up to then the largest terrorist attack on American soil.

Kashmiri Hostage-taking, July 4, 1995: In India six foreigners, including two U.S. citizens, were taken hostage by Al-Faran, a Kashmiri separatist group. One non-U.S. hostage was later found beheaded.

Jerusalem Bus Attack, August 21, 1995: HAMAS claimed responsibility for the detonation of a bomb that killed 6 and injured over 100 persons, including several U.S. citizens.

Attack on U.S. Embassy in Moscow, September 13, 1995: A rocket-propelled grenade was fired through the window of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, ostensibly in retaliation for U.S. strikes on Serb positions in Bosnia.

Saudi Military Installation Attack, November 13, 1995: The Islamic Movement of Change planted a bomb in a Riyadh military compound that killed one U.S. citizen, several foreign national employees of the U.S. government, and over 40 others.

Egyptian Embassy Attack, November 19, 1995: A suicide bomber drove a vehicle into the Egyptian Embassy compound in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing at least 16 and injuring 60 persons. Three militant Islamic groups claimed responsibility.

1996

Papuan Hostage Abduction, January 8, 1996: In Indonesia, 200 Free Papua Movement (OPM) guerrillas abducted 26 individuals in the Lorenta nature preserve, Irian Jaya Province. Indonesian Special Forces members rescued the remaining nine hostages on May 15.

Kidnapping in Colombia, January 19, 1996: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas kidnapped a US citizen and demanded a $1 million ransom. The hostage was released on May 22.

Tamil Tigers Attack, January 31, 1996: Members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rammed an explosives-laden truck into the Central Bank in the heart of downtown Colombo, Sri Lanka, killing 90 civilians and injuring more than 1,400 others, including 2 US citizens.

IRA Bombing, February 9, 1996: An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb detonated in London, killing 2 persons and wounding more than 100 others, including 2 U.S. citizens.

Athens Embassy Attack, February 15, 1996: Unidentified assailants fired a rocket at the U.S. Embassy compound in Athens, causing minor damage to three diplomatic vehicles and some surrounding buildings. Circumstances of the attack suggested it was an operation carried out by the 17 November group.

ELN Kidnapping, February 16, 1996: Six alleged National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen in Colombia. After 9 months, the hostage was released.

HAMAS Bus Attack, February 26, 1996: In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber blew up a bus, killing 26 persons, including three U.S. citizens, and injuring some 80 persons, including three other US citizens.

Dizengoff Center Bombing, March 4, 1996: HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) both claimed responsibility for a bombing outside of Tel Aviv's largest shopping mall that killed 20 persons and injured 75 others, including 2 U.S. citizens.

West Bank Attack, May 13, 1996: Arab gunmen opened fire on a bus and a group of Yeshiva students near the Bet El settlement, killing a dual U.S./Israeli citizen and wounding three Israelis. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but HAMAS was suspected.

AID Worker Abduction, May 31, 1996: A gang of former Contra guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. employee of the Agency for International Development (AID) who was assisting with election preparations in rural northern Nicaragua. She was released unharmed the next day after members of the international commission overseeing the preparations intervened.

Zekharya Attack, June 9, 1996: Unidentified gunmen opened fire on a car near Zekharya, killing a dual U.S./Israeli citizen and an Israeli. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was suspected.

Manchester Truck Bombing, June 15, 1996: An IRA truck bomb detonated at a Manchester shopping center, wounding 206 persons, including two German tourists, and caused extensive property damage.

Khobar Towers Bombing, June 25, 1996: A fuel truck carrying a bomb exploded outside the US military's Khobar Towers housing facility in Dhahran, killing 19 U.S. military personnel and wounding 515 persons, including 240 U.S. personnel. Several groups claimed responsibility for the attack.

ETA Bombing, July 20, 1996: A bomb exploded at Tarragona International Airport in Reus, Spain, wounding 35 persons, including British and Irish tourists. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization was suspected.

Bombing of Archbishop of Oran, August 1, 1996: A bomb exploded at the home of the French Archbishop of Oran, killing him and his chauffeur. The attack occurred after the Archbishop's meeting with the French Foreign Minister. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is suspected.

Sudanese Rebel Kidnapping, August 17, 1996: Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels kidnapped six missionaries in Mapourdit, including a U.S. citizen, an Italian, three Australians, and a Sudanese. The SPLA released the hostages 11 days later.

PUK Kidnapping, September 13, 1996: In Iraq, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) militants kidnapped four French workers for Pharmaciens Sans Frontieres, a Canadian United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) official, and two Iraqis.

Assassination of South Korean Consul, October 1, 1996: In Vladivostok, Russia, assailants attacked and killed a South Korean consul near his home. No one claimed responsibility, but South Korean authorities believed that the attack was carried out by professionals and that the assailants were North Koreans. North Korean officials denied the country's involvement in the attack.

Red Cross Worker Kidnappings, November 1, 1996: In Sudan a breakaway group from the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) kidnapped three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) workers, including a U.S. citizen, an Australian, and a Kenyan. On 9 December the rebels released the hostages in exchange for ICRC supplies and a health survey for their camp.

Paris Subway Explosion, December 3, 1996: A bomb exploded aboard a Paris subway train as it arrived at the Port Royal station, killing two French nationals, a Moroccan, and a Canadian, and injuring 86 persons. Among those injured were one U.S. citizen and a Canadian. No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but Algerian extremists are suspected.

Abduction of US. Citizen by FARC, December 11, 1996: Five armed men claiming to be members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) kidnapped and later killed a U.S. geologist at a methane gas exploration site in La Guajira Department.

Tupac Amaru Seizure of Diplomats, December 17, 1996: Twenty-three members of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) took several hundred people hostage at a party given at the Japanese Ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru. Among the hostages were several US officials, foreign ambassadors and other diplomats, Peruvian Government officials, and Japanese businessmen. The group demanded the release of all MRTA members in prison and safe passage for them and the hostage takers. The terrorists released most of the hostages in December but held 81 Peruvians and Japanese citizens for several months.

1997

Egyptian Letter Bombs, January 2-13, 1997: A series of letter bombs with Alexandria, Egypt, postmarks were discovered at Al-Hayat newspaper bureaus in Washington, New York City, London, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Three similar devices, also postmarked in Egypt, were found at a prison facility in Leavenworth, Kansas. Bomb disposal experts defused all the devices, but one detonated at the Al-Hayat office in London, injuring two security guards and causing minor damage.

Tajik Hostage Abductions, February 4-17, 1997: Near Komsomolabad, Tajikistan, a paramilitary group led by Bakhrom Sodirov abducted four United Nations (UN) military observers. The victims included two Swiss, one Austrian, one Ukrainian, and their Tajik interpreter. The kidnappers demanded safe passage for their supporters from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. In four separate incidents occurring between Dushanbe and Garm, Bakhrom Sodirov and his group kidnapped two International Committee for the Red Cross members, four Russian journalists and their Tajik driver, four UNHCR members, and the Tajik Security Minister, Saidamir Zukhurov.

Venezuelan Abduction, February 14, 1997: Six armed Colombian guerrillas kidnapped a US oil engineer and his Venezuelan pilot in Apure, Venezuela. The kidnappers released the Venezuelan pilot on 22 February. According to authorities, the FARC is responsible for the kidnapping.

Empire State Building Sniper Attack, February 23, 1997: A Palestinian gunman opened fire on tourists at an observation deck atop the Empire State Building in New York City, killing a Danish national and wounding visitors from the United States, Argentina, Switzerland, and France before turning the gun on himself. A handwritten note carried by the gunman claimed this was a punishment attack against the "enemies of Palestine."

ELN Kidnapping, February 24, 1997: National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen employed by a Las Vegas gold corporation who was scouting a gold mining operation in Colombia. The ELN demanded a ransom of $2.5 million.

FARC Kidnapping, March 7, 1997: FARC guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. mining employee and his Colombian colleague who were searching for gold in Colombia. On November 16, the rebels released the two hostages after receiving a $50,000 ransom.

Hotel Nacional Bombing, July 12, 1997: A bomb exploded at the Hotel Nacional in Havana, injuring three persons and causing minor damage. A previously unknown group calling itself the Military Liberation Union claimed responsibility.

Israeli Shopping Mall Bombing, September 4, 1997: Three suicide bombers of HAMAS detonated bombs in the Ben Yehuda shopping mall in Jerusalem, killing eight persons, including the bombers, and wounding nearly 200 others. A dual U.S./Israeli citizen was among the dead, and 7 U.S. citizens were wounded.

OAS Abductions, October 23, 1997: In Colombia ELN rebels kidnapped two foreign members of the Organization of American States (OAS) and a Colombian human rights official at a roadblock. The ELN claimed that the kidnapping was intended "to show the international community that the elections in Colombia are a farce."

Yemeni Kidnappings, October 30, 1997: Al-Sha'if tribesmen kidnapped a U.S. businessman near Sanaa. The tribesmen sought the release of two fellow tribesmen who were arrested on smuggling charges and several public works projects they claim the government promised them. They released the hostage on November 27.

Murder of U.S. Businessmen in Pakistan, November 12, 1997: Two unidentified gunmen shot to death four U.S. auditors from Union Texas Petroleum Corporation and their Pakistani driver after they drove away from the Sheraton Hotel in Karachi. The Islami Inqilabi Council, or Islamic Revolutionary Council, claimed responsibility in a call to the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. In a letter to Pakistani newspapers, the Aimal Khufia Action Committee also claimed responsibility.

Tourist Killings in Egypt, November 17, 1997: Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG) gunmen shot and killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians and wounded 26 others at the Hatshepsut Temple in the Valley of the Kings near Luxor. Thirty-four Swiss, eight Japanese, five Germans, four Britons, one French, one Colombian, a dual Bulgarian/British citizen, and four unidentified persons were among the dead. Twelve Swiss, two Japanese, two Germans, one French, and nine Egyptians were among the wounded.

1998

UN Observer Abductions, February 19, 1998: Armed supporters of late Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia abducted four UN military observers from Sweden, Uruguay, and the Czech Republic.

FARC Abduction, March 21-23, 1998: FARC rebels kidnapped a US citizen in Sabaneta, Colombia. FARC members also killed three persons, wounded 14, and kidnapped at least 27 others at a roadblock near Bogota. Four U.S. citizens and one Italian were among those kidnapped, as well as the acting president of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and his wife.

Somali Hostage-takings, April 15, 1998: Somali militiamen abducted nine Red Cross and Red Crescent workers at an airstrip north of Mogadishu. The hostages included a U.S. citizen, a German, a Belgian, a French, a Norwegian, two Swiss, and one Somali. The gunmen were members of a sub-clan loyal to Ali Mahdi Mohammed, who controlled the northern section of the capital.

IRA Bombing, Banbridge, August 1, 1998: A 500-pound car bomb planted by the Real IRA exploded outside a shoe store in Banbridge, North Ireland, injuring 35 persons and damaging at least 200 homes.

U.S. Embassy Bombings in East Africa, August 7, 1998: A bomb exploded at the rear entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 12 U.S. citizens, 32 Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and 247 Kenyan citizens. Approximately 5,000 Kenyans, 6 U.S. citizens, and 13 FSNs were injured. The U.S. Embassy building sustained extensive structural damage. Almost simultaneously, a bomb detonated outside the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 7 FSNs and 3 Tanzanian citizens, and injuring 1 U.S. citizen and 76 Tanzanians. The explosion caused major structural damage to the U.S. Embassy facility. The U.S. Government held Usama Bin Laden responsible.

IRA Bombing, Omagh, August 15, 1998: A 500-pound car bomb planted by the Real IRA exploded outside a local courthouse in the central shopping district of Omagh, Northern Ireland, killing 29 persons and injuring over 330.

Colombian Pipeline Bombing, October 18, 1998: A National Liberation Army (ELN) planted bomb exploded on the Ocensa pipeline in Antioquia Department, killing approximately 71 persons and injuring at least 100 others. The pipeline is jointly owned by the Colombia State Oil Company Ecopetrol and a consortium including U.S., French, British, and Canadian companies.

Armed Kidnapping in Colombia, November 15, 1998: Armed assailants followed a U.S. businessman and his family home in Cundinamarca Department and kidnapped his 11-year-old son after stealing money, jewelry, one automobile, and two cell phones. The kidnappers demanded $1 million in ransom. On January 21, 1999, the kidnappers released the boy.

1999

Angolan Aircraft Downing, January 2, 1999: A UN plane carrying one U.S. citizen, four Angolans, two Philippine nationals and one Namibian was shot down, according to a UN official. No deaths or injuries were reported. Angolan authorities blamed the attack on National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels. UNITA officials denied shooting down the plane.

Ugandan Rebel Attack, February 14, 1999: A pipe bomb exploded inside a bar, killing five persons and injuring 35 others. One Ethiopian and four Ugandan nationals died in the blast, and one U.S. citizen working for USAID, two Swiss nationals, one Pakistani, one Ethiopian, and 27 Ugandans were injured. Ugandan authorities blamed the attack on the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF).

Greek Embassy Seizure, February 16, 1999: Kurdish protesters stormed and occupied the Greek Embassy in Vienna, taking the Greek Ambassador and six other persons hostage. Several hours later the protesters released the hostages and left the Embassy. The attack followed the Turkish Government's announcement of the successful capture of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan. Kurds also occupied Kenyan, Israeli, and other Greek diplomatic facilities in France, Holland, Switzerland, Britain, and Germany over the following days.

FARC Kidnappings, February 25, 1999: FARC kidnapped three U.S. citizens working for the Hawaii-based Pacific Cultural Conservancy International. On March 4, the bodies of the three victims were found in Venezuela.

Hutu Abductions, March 1, 1999: 150 armed Hutu rebels attacked three tourist camps in Uganda, killed four Ugandans, and abducted three U.S. citizens, six Britons, three New Zealanders, two Danish citizens, one Australian, and one Canadian national. Two of the U.S. citizens and six of the other hostages were subsequently killed by their abductors.

ELN Hostage-taking, March 23, 1999: Armed guerrillas kidnapped a U.S. citizen in Boyaca, Colombia. The National Liberation Army (ELN) claimed responsibility and demanded $400,000 ransom. On 20 July, ELN rebels released the hostage unharmed following a ransom payment of $48,000.

ELN Hostage-taking, May 30, 1999: In Cali, Colombia, armed ELN militants attacked a church in the neighborhood of Ciudad Jardin, kidnapping 160 persons, including six U.S. citizens and one French national. The rebels released approximately 80 persons, including three U.S. citizens, later that day.

Shell Platform Bombing, June 27, 1999: In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, armed youths stormed a Shell oil platform, kidnapping one U.S. citizen, one Nigerian national, and one Australian citizen, and causing undetermined damage. A group calling itself "Enough is Enough in the Niger River" claimed responsibility. Further seizures of oil facilities followed.

AFRC Kidnappings, August 4, 1999: An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) faction kidnapped 33 UN representatives near Occra Hills, Sierra Leone. The hostages included one U.S. citizen, five British soldiers, one Canadian citizen, one representative from Ghana, one military officer from Russia, one officer from Kyrgystan, one officer from Zambia, one officer from Malaysia, a local Bishop, two UN officials, two local journalists, and 16 Sierra Leonean nationals.

Burmese Embassy Seizure, October 1, 1999: Burmese dissidents seized the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, taking 89 persons hostage, including one U.S. citizen.

PLA Kidnapping, December 23, 1999: Colombian People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces kidnapped a U.S. citizen in an unsuccessful ransoming effort.

Indian Airlines Airbus Hijacking, December 24, 1999: Five militants hijacked a flight bound from Katmandu to New Delhi carrying 189 people. The plane and its passengers were released unharmed on December 31.

2000

Car bombing in Spain, January 27, 2000: Police officials reported unidentified individuals set fire to a Citroen car dealership in Iturreta, causing extensive damage to the building and destroying 12 vehicles. The attack bore the hallmark of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA).

RUF Attacks on U.N. Mission Personnel, May 1, 2000: On 1 May in Makeni, Sierra Leone, Revolutionary United Front (RUF) militants kidnapped at least 20 members of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and surrounded and opened fire on a UNAMSIL facility, according to press reports. The militants killed five UN soldiers in the attack. RUF militants kidnapped 300 UNAMSIL peacekeepers throughout the country, according to press reports. On 15 May in Foya, Liberia, the kidnappers released 139 hostages. On 28 May, on the Liberia and Sierra Leone border, armed militants released unharmed the last of the UN peacekeepers. In Freetown, according to press reports, armed militants ambushed two military vehicles carrying four journalists. A Spaniard and one U.S. citizen were killed in a May 25 car bombing in Freetown for which the RUF was probably responsible. Suspected RUF rebels also kidnapped 21 Indian UN peacekeepers in Freetown on June 6. Additional attacks by RUF on foreign personnel followed.

Diplomatic Assassination in Greece, June 8, 2000: In Athens, Greece, two unidentified gunmen killed British Defense Attaché Stephen Saunders in an ambush. The Revolutionary Organization 17 November claimed responsibility.

ELN Kidnapping, June 27, 2000: In Bogota, Colombia, ELN militants kidnapped a 5-year-old U.S. citizen and his Colombian mother, demanding an undisclosed ransom.

Kidnappings in Kyrgyzstan, August 12, 2000: In the Kara-Su Valley, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan took four U.S. citizens hostage. The Americans escaped on August 12.

Church Bombing in Tajikistan, October 1, 2000: Unidentified militants detonated two bombs in a Christian church in Dushanbe, killing seven persons and injuring 70 others. The church was founded by a Korean-born U.S. citizen, and most of those killed and wounded were Korean. No one claimed responsibility.

Helicopter Hijacking, October 12, 2000: In Sucumbios Province, Ecuador, a group of armed kidnappers led by former members of defunct Colombian terrorist organization the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), took hostage 10 employees of Spanish energy consortium REPSOL. Those kidnapped included five U.S. citizens, one Argentine, one Chilean, one New Zealander, and two French pilots who escaped four days later. On January 30, 2001, the kidnappers murdered American hostage Ronald Sander. The remaining hostages were released on February 23 following the payment of $13 million in ransom by the oil companies.

Attack on U.S.S. Cole, October 12, 2000: In Aden, Yemen, a small dingy carrying explosives rammed the destroyer U.S.S. Cole, killing 17 sailors and injuring 39 others. Supporters of Usama Bin Laden were suspected.

Manila Bombing, December 30, 2000: A bomb exploded in a plaza across the street from the U.S. Embassy in Manila, injuring nine persons. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front was likely responsible.

2001

Srinagar Airport Attack and Assassination Attempt, January 17, 2001: In India, six members of the Lashkar-e-Tayyba militant group were killed when they attempted to seize a local airport. Members of Hizbul Mujaheddin fired two rifle grenades at Farooq Abdullah, Chief Minister for Jammu and Kashmir. Two persons were wounded in the unsuccessful assassination attempt.

BBC Studios Bombing, March 4, 2001: A car bomb exploded at midnight outside of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s main production studios in London. One person was injured. British authorities suspected the Real IRA had planted the bomb.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, March 4, 2001: A suicide bomb attack in Netanya killed 3 persons and wounded 65. HAMAS later claimed responsibility.

ETA Bombing, March 9, 2001: Two policemen were killed by the explosion of a car bomb in Hernani, Spain.

Airliner Hijacking in Istanbul, March 15, 2001: Three Chechens hijacked a Russian airliner during a flight from Istanbul to Moscow and forced it to fly to Medina, Saudi Arabia. The plane carried 162 passengers and a crew of 12. After a 22-hour siege during which more than 40 passengers were released, Saudi security forces stormed the plane, killing a hijacker, a passenger, and a flight attendant.

Bus Stop Bombing, April 22, 2001: A member of HAMAS detonated a bomb he was carrying near a bus stop in Kfar Siva, Israel, killing one person and injuring 60.

Philippines Hostage Incident, May 27, 2001: Muslim Abu Sayyaf guerrillas seized 13 tourists and 3 staff members at a resort on Palawan Island and took their captives to Basilan Island. The captives included three U.S. citizens: Guellermo Sobero and missionaries Martin and Gracia Burnham. Philippine troops fought a series of battles with the guerrillas between June 1 and June 3 during which 9 hostages escaped and two were found dead. The guerrillas took additional hostages when they seized the hospital in the town of Lamitan. On June 12, Abu Sayyaf spokesman Abu Sabaya claimed that Sobero had been killed and beheaded; his body was found in October. The Burnhams remained in captivity until June 2002.

Tel-Aviv Nightclub Bombing, June 1, 2001: HAMAS claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing of a popular Israeli nightclub that caused over 140 casualties.

HAMAS Restaurant Bombing, August 9, 2001: A HAMAS-planted bomb detonated in a Jerusalem pizza restaurant, killing 15 people and wounding more than 90. The Israeli response included occupation of Orient House, the Palestine Liberation Organization’s political headquarters in East Jerusalem.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, September 9, 2001: The first suicide bombing carried out by an Israeli Arab killed 3 persons in Nahariya. HAMAS claimed responsibility.

Death of "the Lion of the Panjshir", September 9, 2001: Two suicide bombers fatally wounded Ahmed Shah Massoud, a leader of Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, which had opposed both the Soviet occupation and the post-Soviet Taliban government. The bombers posed as journalists and were apparently linked to al-Qaida. The Northern Alliance did not confirm Massoud’s death until September 15.

Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Homeland, September 11, 2001: Two hijacked airliners crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Center. Soon thereafter, the Pentagon was struck by a third hijacked plane. A fourth hijacked plane, suspected to be bound for a high-profile target in Washington, crashed into a field in southern Pennsylvania. The attacks killed 3,025 U.S. citizens and other nationals. President Bush and Cabinet officials indicated that Usama Bin Laden was the prime suspect and that they considered the United States in a state of war with international terrorism. In the aftermath of the attacks, the United States formed the Global Coalition Against Terrorism.

Attack on the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature, October 1, 2001: After a suicide car bomber forced the gate of the state legislature in Srinagar, two gunmen entered the building and held off police for seven hours before being killed. Forty persons died in the incident. Jaish-e-Muhammad claimed responsibility.

Anthrax Attacks, October-November 2001: On October 7 the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported that investigators had detected evidence that the deadly anthrax bacterium was present in the building where a Florida man who died of anthrax on October 5 had worked. Discovery of a second anthrax case triggered a major investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The two anthrax cases were the first to appear in the United States in 25 years. Anthrax subsequently appeared in mail received by television networks in New York and by the offices in Washington of Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle and other members of Congress. Attorney General John Ashcroft said in a briefing on October 16, "When people send anthrax through the mail to hurt people and invoke terror, it’s a terrorist act."

Assassination of an Israeli Cabinet Minister, October 17, 2001: A Palestinian gunman assassinated Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Zeevi in the Jerusalem hotel where he was staying. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed to have avenged the death of PFLP Mustafa Zubari.

Attack on a Church in Pakistan, October 28, 2001: Six masked gunmen shot up a church in Bahawalpur, Pakistan, killing 15 Pakistani Christians. No group claimed responsibility, although various militant Muslim groups were suspected.

Suicide Bombings in Jerusalem, December 1, 2001: Two suicide bombers attacked a Jerusalem shopping mall, killing 10 persons and wounding 170.

Suicide Bombing in Haifa, December 2, 2001: A suicide bomb attack aboard a bus in Haifa, Israel, killed 15 persons and wounded 40. HAMAS claimed responsibility for both this attack and those on December 1 to avenge the death of a HAMAS member at the hands of Israeli forces a week earlier.

Attack on the Indian Parliament, December 13, 2001: Five gunmen attacked the Indian Parliament in New Delhi shortly after it had adjourned. Before security forces killed them, the attackers killed 6 security personnel and a gardener. Indian officials blamed Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and demanded that Pakistan crack down on it and on other Muslim separatist groups in Kashmir.

2002

Ambush on the West Bank, January 15, 2002: Palestinian militants fired on a vehicle in Beit Sahur, killing one passenger and wounding the other. The dead passenger claimed U.S. and Israeli citizenship. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Battalion claimed responsibility.

Shooting Incident in Israel, January 17, 2002: A Palestinian gunman killed 6 persons and wounded 25 in Hadera, Israel, before being killed by Israeli police. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility as revenge for Israel’s killing of a leading member of the group.

Drive-By Shooting at a U.S. Consulate, January 22, 2002: Armed militants on motorcycles fired on the U.S. Consulate in Calcutta, India, killing 5 Indian security personnel and wounding 13 others. The Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami and the Asif Raza Commandoes claimed responsibility. Indian police later killed two suspects, one of whom confessed to belonging to Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as he died.

Bomb Explosion in Kashmir, January 22, 2002: A bomb exploded in a crowded retail district in Jammu, Kashmir, killing one person and injuring nine. No group claimed responsibility.

Kidnapping of Daniel Pearl, January 23, 2002: Armed militants kidnapped Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi, Pakistan. Pakistani authorities received a videotape on February 20 depicting Pearl’s murder. His grave was found near Karachi on May 16. Pakistani authorities arrested four suspects. Ringleader Ahmad Omar Saeed Sheikh claimed to have organized Pearl’s kidnapping to protest Pakistan’s subservience to the United States, and had belonged to Jaish-e-Muhammad, an Islamic separatist group in Kashmir. All four suspects were convicted on July 15. Saeed Sheikh was sentenced to death, the others to life imprisonment.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, January 27, 2002: A suicide bomb attack in Jerusalem killed one other person and wounded 100. The incident was the first suicide bombing made by a Palestinian woman.

Suicide Bombing in the West Bank, February 16, 2002: A suicide bombing in an outdoor food court in Karmei Shomron killed 4 persons and wounded 27. Two of the dead and two of the wounded were U.S. citizens. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in the West Bank, March 7, 2002: A suicide bombing in a supermarket in the settlement of Ariel wounded 10 persons, one of whom was a U.S. citizen. The PFLP claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, March 9, 2002: A suicide bombing in a Jerusalem restaurant killed 11 persons and wounded 52, one of whom was a U.S. citizen. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Drive-By Shooting in Colombia, March 14, 2002: Gunmen on motorcycles shot and killed two U.S. citizens who had come to Cali, Colombia, to negotiate the release of their father, who was a captive of the FARC. No group claimed responsibility.

Grenade Attack on a Church in Pakistan, March 17, 2002: Militants threw grenades into the Protestant International Church in Islamabad, Pakistan, during a service attended by diplomatic and local personnel. Five persons, two of them U.S. citizens, were killed and 46 were wounded. The dead Americans were State Department employee Barbara Green and her daughter Kristen Wormsley. Thirteen U.S. citizens were among the wounded. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba group was suspected.

Car Bomb Explosion in Peru, March 20, 2002: A car bomb exploded at a shopping center near the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru. Nine persons were killed and 32 wounded. The dead included two police officers and a teenager. Peruvian authorities suspected either the Shining Path rebels or the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. The attack occurred 3 days before President George W. Bush visited Peru.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, March 21, 2002: A suicide bombing in Jerusalem killed 3 persons and wounded 86 more, including 2 U.S. citizens. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, March 27, 2002: A suicide bombing in a noted restaurant in Netanya, Israel, killed 22 persons and wounded 140. One of the dead was a U.S. citizen. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.

Temple Bombing in Kashmir, March 30, 2002: A bomb explosion at a Hindu temple in Jammu, Kashmir, killed 10 persons. The Islamic Front claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in the West Bank, March 31, 2002: A suicide bombing near an ambulance station in Efrat wounded four persons, including a U.S. citizen. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Armed attack on Kashmir, April 10, 2002: Armed militants attacked a residence in Gando, Kashmir, killing five persons and wounding four. No group claimed responsibility.

Synagogue Bombing in Tunisia, April 11, 2002: A suicide bomber detonated a truck loaded with propane gas outside a historic synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia. The 16 dead included 11 Germans, one French citizen, and three Tunisians. Twenty-six German tourists were injured. The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Sites claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, April 12, 2002: A female suicide bomber killed 6 persons in Jerusalem and wounded 90 others. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Car Bombing in Pakistan, May 8, 2002: A car bomb exploded near a Pakistani navy shuttle bus in Karachi, killing 12 persons and wounding 19. Eleven of the dead and 11 of the wounded were French nationals. Al-Qaida was suspected of the attack.

Parade Bombing in Russia, May 9, 2002: A remotely-controlled bomb exploded near a May Day parade in Kaspiisk, Dagestan, killing 42 persons and wounding 150. Fourteen of the dead and 50 of the wounded were soldiers. Islamists linked to al-Qaida were suspected.

Attack on a Bus in India, May 14, 2002: Militants fired on a passenger bus in Kaluchak, Jammu, killing 7 persons. They then entered a military housing complex and killed 3 soldiers and 7 military dependents before they were killed. The al-Mansooran and Jamiat ul-Mujahedin claimed responsibility.

Bomb Attacks in Kashmir, May 17, 2002: A bomb explosion near a civil secretariat area in Srinagar, Kashmir, wounded 6 persons. In Jammu, a bomb exploded at a fire services headquarters, killing two and wounding 16. No group claimed responsibility for either attack.

Hostage Rescue Attempt in the Philippines, June 7, 2002: Philippine Army troops attacked Abu Sayyaf terrorists on Mindanao Island in an attempt to rescue U.S. citizen Martin Burnham and his wife Gracia, who had been kidnapped more than a year ago. Burnham was killed but his wife, though wounded, was freed. A Filipino hostage was killed, as were four of the guerrillas. Seven soldiers were wounded.

Car Bombing in Pakistan, June 14, 2002: A car bomb exploded near the U.S. Consulate and the Marriott Hotel in Karachi, Pakistan. Eleven persons were killed and 51 were sounded, including one U.S. and one Japanese citizen. Al Qaida and al-Qanin were suspected.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, June 19, 2002: A suicide bombing at a bus stop in Jerusalem killed 6 persons and wounded 43, including 2 U.S. citizens. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Tel Aviv, July 17, 2002: Two suicide bombers attacked the old bus station in Tel Aviv, Israel, killing 5 persons and wounding 38. The dead included one Romanian and two Chinese; another Romanian was wounded. The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

Bombing at the Hebrew University, July 31, 2002: A bomb hidden in a bag in the Frank Sinatra International Student Center of Jerusalem’s Hebrew University killed 9 persons and wounded 87. The dead included 5 U.S. citizens and 4 Israelis. The wounded included 4 U.S. citizens, 2 Japanese, and 3 South Koreans. The Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, August 4, 2002: A suicide bomb attack on a bus in Safed, Israel, killed 9 persons and wounded 50. Two of the dead were Philippine citizens; many of the wounded were soldiers returning from leave. HAMAS claimed responsibility.

Attack on a School in Pakistan, August 5, 2002: Gunmen attacked a Christian school attended by children of missionaries from around the world. Six persons (two security guards, a cook, a carpenter, a receptionist, and a private citizen) were killed and a Philippine citizen was wounded. A group called al-Intigami al-Pakistani claimed responsibility.

Attack on Pilgrims in Kashmir, August 6, 2002: Armed militants attacked a group of Hindu pilgrims with guns and grenades in Pahalgam, Kashmir. Nine persons were killed and 32 were wounded. The Lashkar-e-Tayyiba claimed responsibility.

Assassination in Kashmir, September 11, 2002: Gunmen killed Kashmir’s Law Minister Mushtaq Ahmed Lone and six security guards in Tikipora. Lashkar-e-Tayyiga, Jamiat ul-Mujahedin, and Hizb ul-Mujahedin all claimed responsibility. Other militants attacked the residence of the Minister of Tourism with grenades, injuring four persons. No group claimed responsibility.

Ambush on the West Bank, September 18, 2002: Gunmen ambushed a vehicle on a road near Yahad, killing an Israeli and wounding a Romanian worker. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bomb Attack in Israel, September 19, 2002: A suicide bomb attack on a bus in Tel Aviv killed 6 persons and wounded 52. One of the dead was a British subject. HAMAS claimed responsibility.

Attack on a French Tanker, October 6, 2002: An explosive-laden boat rammed the French oil tanker Limburg, which was anchored about 5 miles off al-Dhabbah, Yemen. One person was killed and 4 were wounded. Al-Qaida was suspected.

Car Bomb Explosion in Bali, October 12, 2002: A car bomb exploded outside the Sari Club Discotheque in Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia, killing 202 persons and wounding 300 more. Most of the casualties, including 88 of the dead, were Australian tourists. Seven Americans were among the dead. Al-Qaida claimed responsibility. Two suspects were later arrested and convicted. Iman Samudra, who had trained in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda and was suspected of belonging to Jemaah Islamiya, was sentenced to death on September 10, 2003.

Chechen Rebels Seize a Moscow Theater, October 23-26, 2002: Fifty Chechen rebels led by Movsar Barayev seized the Palace of Culture Theater in Moscow, Russia, to demand an end to the war in Chechnya. They seized more than 800 hostages from 13 countries and threatened to blow up the theater. During a three-day siege, they killed a Russian policeman and five Russian hostages. On October 26, Russian Special Forces pumped an anesthetic gas through the ventilation system and then stormed the theater. All of the rebels were killed, but 94 hostages (including one American) also died, many from the effects of the gas. A group led by Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility.

Assassination of an AID Official, October 28, 2002: Gunmen in Amman assassinated Laurence Foley, Executive Officer of the U.S. Agency for International Development Mission in Jordan. The Honest People of Jordan claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, November 21, 2002: A suicide bomb attack on a bus on Mexico Street in Jerusalem killed 11 persons and wounded 50 more. One of the dead was a Romanian. HAMAS claimed responsibility.

Attack on Temples in Kashmir, November 24, 2002: Armed militants attacked the Reghunath and Shiv temples in Jammu, Kashmir, killing 13 persons and wounding 50. The Lashkare-e-Tayyiba claimed responsibility.

Attacks on Israeli Tourists in Kenya, November 28, 2002: A three-person suicide car bomb attack on the Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killed 15 persons and wounded 40. Three of the dead and 18 of the wounded were Israeli tourists; the others were Kenyans. Near Mombasa’s airport, two SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles were fired as an Arkia Airlines Boeing 757 that was carrying 261 passengers back to Israel. Both missiles missed. Al-Qaida, the Government of Universal Palestine in Exile, and the Army of Palestine claimed responsibility for both attacks. Al-Ittihad al-Islami was also suspected of involvement.

Attack on a Bus in the Philippines, December 26, 2002: Armed militants ambushed a bus carrying Filipino workers employed by the Canadian Toronto Ventures Inc. Pacific mining company in Zamboanga del Norte. Thirteen persons were killed and 10 wounded. Philippine authorities suspected the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which had been extorting money from Toronto Ventures. The Catholic charity Caritas-Philippines said that Toronto Ventures had harassed tribesmen who opposed mining on their ancestral lands.

Bombing of a Government Building in Chechnya, December 27, 2002: A suicide bomb attack involving two explosives-laden trucks destroyed the offices of the pro-Russian Chechen government in Grozny. The attack killed over 80 people and wounded 210. According to a Chechen website run by the Kavkaz Center, Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility.

2003

Suicide Bombings in Tel Aviv, January 5, 2003: Two suicide bomb attacks killed 22 and wounded at least 100 persons in Tel Aviv, Israel. Six of the victims were foreign workers. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Night Club Bombing in Colombia, February 7, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside a night club in Bogota, Colombia, killing 32 persons and wounding 160. No group claimed responsibility, but Colombian officials suspected the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) of committing the worst terrorist attack in the country in a decade.

Assasination of a Kurdish Leader, February 8, 2003: Members of Ansar al-Islam assassinated Kurdish legislator Shawkat Haji Mushir and captured two other Kurdish officials in Qamash Tapa in northern Iraq.

Suicide Bombing in Haifa, March 5, 2003: A suicide bombing aboard a bus in Haifa, Israel, killed 15 persons and wounded at least 40. One of the dead claimed U.S. as well as Israeli citizenship. The bomber’s affiliation was not immediately known.

Suicide Bombing in Netanya, March 30, 2003: A suicide bombing in a cafe in Netanya, Israel, wounded 38 persons. Only the bomber was killed. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility and called the attack a "gift" to the people of Iraq.

Unsuccessful Hostage Rescue Attempt in Colombia, May 5, 2003: The FARC killed 10 hostages when Colombian special forces tried to rescue them from a jungle hideout near Urrao, in Colombia’s Antioquia State. The dead included Governor Guillermo Gavira and former Defense Minister Gilberto Echeverri Mejia, who had been kidnapped in April 2002.

Truck Bomb Attacks in Saudi Arabia, May 12, 2003: Suicide bombers attacked three residential compounds for foreign workers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The 34 dead included 9 attackers, 7 other Saudis, 9 U.S. citizens, and one citizen each from the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Philippines. Another American died on June 1. It was the first major attack on U.S. targets in Saudi Arabia since the end of the war in Iraq. Saudi authorities arrested 11 al-Qaida suspects on May 28.

Truck Bombing in Chechnya, May 12, 2003: A truck bomb explosion demolished a government compound in Znamenskoye, Chechnya, killing 54 persons. Russian authorities blamed followers of a Saudi-born Islamist named Abu Walid. President Vladimir Putin said that he suspected that there was an al-Qaida connection.

Attempted Assassination in Chechnya, May 12, 2003: Two female suicide bombers attacked Chechen Administrator Mufti Akhmed Kadyrov during a religious festival in Iliskhan Yurt. Kadyrov escaped injury, but 14 other persons were killed and 43 were wounded. Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bomb Attacks in Morocco, May 16, 2003: A team of 12 suicide bombers attacked five targets in Casablanca, Morocco, killing 43 persons and wounding 100. The targets were a Spanish restaurant, a Jewish community, a Jewish cemetery, a hotel, and the Belgian Consulate. The Moroccan Government blamed the Islamist al-Assirat al-Moustaquim (The Righteous Path), but foreign commentators suspected an al-Qaida connection.

Suicide Bomb Attack in Jerusalem, May 18, 2003: A suicide bomb attack on a bus in Jerusalem’s French Hill district killed 7 persons and wounded 20. The bomber was disguised as a religious Jew. HAMAS claimed responsibility

Suicide Bombing in Afula, May 19, 2003: A suicide bomb attack by a female Palestinian student killed 3 persons and wounded 52 at a shopping mall in Afula, Israel. Both Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, June 11, 2003: A suicide bombing aboard a bus in Jerusalem killed 16 persons and wounded at least 70, one of whom died later. HAMAS claimed responsibility, calling it revenge for an Israeli helicopter attack on HAMAS leader Abdelaziz al-Rantisi in Gaza City the day before.

Truck Bombing in Northern Ossetia, August 1, 2003: A suicide truck bomb attack destroyed a Russian military hospital in Mozdok, North Ossetia and killed 50 persons. Russian authorities attributed the attack to followers of Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev.

Hotel Bombing in Indonesia, August 5, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing 10 persons and wounding 150. One of the dead was a Dutch citizen. The wounded included an American, a Canadian, an Australian, and two Chinese. Indonesian authorities suspected the Jemaah Islamiah, which had carried out the October 12, 2002 bombing in Bali.

Bombing of the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, August 7, 2003: A car bomb exploded outside the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq, killing 19 persons and wounding 65. Most of the victims were apparently Iraqis, including 5 police officers. No group claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombings in Israel and the West Bank, August 12, 2003: The first suicide bombings since the June 29 Israeli-Palestinian truce took place. The first, in a supermarket at Rosh Haayin, Israel, killed one person and wounded 14. The second, at a bus stop near the Ariel settlement in the West Bank, killed one person and wounded 3. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed responsibility for the first; HAMAS claimed responsibility for the second.

Bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, August 19, 2003: A truck loaded with surplus Iraqi ordnance exploded outside the United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad’s Canal Hotel. A hospital across the street was also heavily damaged. The 23 dead included UN Special Representative Sergio Viera de Mello. More than 100 persons were wounded. It was not clear whether the bomber was a Baath Party loyalist or a foreign Islamic militant. An al-Qaeda branch called the Brigades of the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri later claimed responsibility.

Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem, August 19, 2003: A suicide bombing aboard a bus in Jerusalem killed 20 persons and injured at least 100, one of whom died later. Five of the dead were American citizens. HAMAS and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, although HAMAS leader al-Rantisi said that his organization remained committed to the truce while reserving the right to respond to Israeli military actions.

Car Bomb Kills Shi’ite Leader in Najaf, August 29, 2003: A car bomb explosion outside the Shrine of the Imam Ali in Najaf, Iraq killed at least 81 persons and wounded at least 140. The dead included the Ayatollah Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim, one of four leading Shi’ite clerics in Iraq. Al-Hakim had been the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) since its establishment in 1982, and SCIRI had recently agreed to work with the U.S.-sponsored Iraqi Governing Council. It was not known whether the perpetrators were Baath Party loyalists, rival Shi’ites, or foreign Islamists.

Suicide Bombings in Israel, September 9, 2003: Two suicide bombings took place in Israel. The first, at a bus stop near the Tsrifin army base southeast of Tel Aviv, killed 7 soldiers and wounded 14 soldiers and a civilian. The second, at a café in Jerusalem’s German Colony neighborhood, killed 6 persons and wounded 40. HAMAS did not claim responsibility until the next day, although a spokesman called the first attack" a response to Israeli aggression."

Assassination of an Iraqi Governing Council Member, September 20, 2003: Gunmen shot and seriously wounded Akila Hashimi, one of three female members of the Iraqi Governing Council, near her home in Baghdad. She died September 25.

A Second Attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad, September 22, 2003: A suicide car bomb attack on the UN Headquarters in Baghdad killed a security guard and wounded 19 other persons.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, October 4, 2003: A Palestinian woman made a suicide bomb attack on a restaurant in Haifa, killing 19 persons and wounding at least 55. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack. The next day, Israel bombed a terrorist training camp in Syria.

Attacks in Iraq, October 9, 2003: Gunmen assassinated a Spanish military attaché in Baghdad. A suicide car bomb attack on an Iraqi police station killed 8 persons and wounded 40.

Car Bombings in Baghdad, October 12, 2003: Two suicide car bombs exploded outside the Baghdad Hotel, which housed U.S. officials. Six persons were killed and 32 wounded. Iraqi and U.S. security personnel apparently kept the cars from actually reaching the hotel.

Bomb Attack on U.S. Diplomats in the Gaza Strip, October 15, 2003: A remote-controlled bomb exploded under a car in a U.S. diplomatic convoy passing through the northern Gaza Strip. Three security guards, all employees of DynCorp, were killed. A fourth was wounded. The diplomats were on their way to interview Palestinian candidates for Fulbright scholarships to study in the United States. Palestinian President Arafat and Prime Minister Qurei condemned the attack, while the major Palestinian militant groups denied responsibility. The next day, Palestinian security forces arrested several suspects, some of whom belonged to the Popular Resistance Committees.

Rocket Attack on the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, October 26, 2003: Iraqis using an improvised rocket launcher bombarded the al-Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, killing one U.S. Army officer and wounding 17 persons. The wounded included 4 U.S. military personnel and seven American civilians. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul D. Wolfowitz, who was staying at the hotel, was not injured. After visiting the wounded, he said, "They’re not going to scare us away; we’re not giving up on this job."

Assassination of a Deputy Mayor in Baghdad, October 26, 2003: Two gunmen believed to be Baath Party loyalists assassinated Faris Abdul Razaq al-Assam, one of three deputy mayors of Baghdad. U.S. officials did not announce al-Assam’s death until October 28.

Wave of Car Bombings in Baghdad, October 27, 2003: A series of suicide car bombings in Baghdad killed at least 35 persons and wounded at least 230. Four attacks were directed at Iraqi police stations, the fifth and most destructive was directed at the International Committee of the Red Cross headquarters, where at least 12 persons were killed. A sixth attack failed when a car bomb failed to explode and the bomber was wounded and captured by Iraqi police. U.S. and Iraqi officials suspected that foreign terrorists were involved; the unsuccessful bomber said he was a Syrian national and carried a Syrian passport. After a meeting with Administrator L. Paul Bremer, President Bush said, "The more successful we are on the ground, the more these killers will react."

Suicide Bombing in Riyadh, November 8, 2003: In Riyadh, a suicide car bombing took place in the Muhaya residential compound, which was occupied mainly by nationals of other Arab countries. Seventeen persons were killed and 122 were wounded. The latter included 4 Americans. The next day, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage said al-Qaeda was probably responsible.

Truck Bombing in Nasiriyah, November 12, 2003: A suicide truck bomb destroyed the headquarters of the Italian military police in Nasiriyah, Iraq, killing 18 Italians and 11 Iraqis and wounding at least 100 persons.

Synagogue Bombings in Istanbul, November 15, 2003: Two suicide truck bombs exploded outside the Neve Shalom and Beth Israel synagogues in Istanbul, killing 25 persons and wounding at least 300 more. The initial claim of responsibility came from a Turkish militant group, the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders’ Front, but Turkish authorities suspected an al-Qaeda connection. The next day, the London-based newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi received an e-mail in which an al-Qaeda branch called the Brigades of the Martyr Abu Hafz al-Masri claimed responsibility for the Istanbul synagogue bombings.

Grenade Attacks in Bogota, November 15, 2003: Grenade attacks on two bars frequented by Americans in Bogota killed one person and wounded 72, including 4 Americans. Colombian authorities suspected FARC (the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The U.S. Embassy suspected that the attacks had targeted Americans and warned against visiting commercial centers and places of entertainment.

More Suicide Truck Bombings in Istanbul, November 20, 2003: Two more suicide truck bombings devastated the British HSBC Bank and the British Consulate General in Istanbul, killing 27 persons and wounding at least 450. The dead included Consul General Roger Short. U.S., British, and Turkish officials suspected that al-Qaeda had struck again. The U.S. Consulate in Istanbul was closed, and the Embassy in Ankara advised American citizens in Istanbul to stay home.

Car Bombing in Kirkuk, November 20, 2003: A suicide car bombing in Kirkuk killed 5 persons. The target appeared to be the headquarters of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. PUK officials suspected the Ansar al-Islam group, which was said to have sheltered fugitive Taliban and al-Qaeda members after the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan.

Attacks on Other Coalition Personnel in Iraq, November 29-30, 2003: Iraqi insurgents stepped up attacks on nationals of other members of the Coalition. On November 29, an ambush in Mahmudiyah killed 7 out of a party of 8 Spanish intelligence officers. Iraqi insurgents also killed two Japanese diplomats near Tikrit. On November 30, another ambush near Tikrit killed two South Korean electrical workers and wounded two more. A Colombian employee of Kellogg Brown & Root was killed and two were wounded in an ambush near Balad.

Train Bombing in Southern Russia, December 5, 2003: A suicide bomb attack killed 42 persons and wounded 150 aboard a Russian commuter train in the south Russian town of Yessentuki. Russian officials suspected Chechen rebels; President Putin said the attack was meant to disrupt legislative elections. Chechen rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov denied any involvement.

Suicide Bombing in Moscow, December 9, 2003: A female suicide bomber killed 5 other persons and wounded 14 outside Moscow’s National Hotel. She was said to be looking for the State Duma.

Suicide Car Bombings in Iraq, December 15, 2003: Two days after the capture of Saddam Hussein, there were two suicide car bomb attacks on Iraqi police stations. One at Husainiyah killed 8 persons and wounded 20. The other, at Ameriyah, wounded 7 Iraqi police. Guards repelled a second vehicle.

Office Bombing in Baghdad, December 19, 2003: A bomb destroyed the Baghdad office of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, killing a woman and wounding at least 7 other persons.

Suicide Car Bombing in Irbil, December 24, 2003: A suicide car bomb attack on the Kurdish Interior Ministry in Irbil, Iraq, killed 5 persons and wounded 101.

Attempted Assassination in Rawalpindi, December 25, 2003: Two suicide truck bombers killed 14 persons as President Musharraf’s motorcade passed through Rawalpindi, Pakistan. An earlier attempt on December 14 caused no casualties. Pakistani officials suspected Afghan and Kashmiri militants. On January 6, 2004, Pakistani authorities announced the arrest of 6 suspects who were said to be members of Jaish-e-Muhammad.

Suicide Bombing in Israel, December 25, 2003: A Palestinian suicide bomber killed 4 persons at a bus stop near Petah Tikva, Israel. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for the attack in retaliation for Israeli military operations in Nablus that had begun two days earlier.

Restaurant Bombing in Baghdad, December 31, 2003: A car bomb explosion outside Baghdad’s Nabil Restaurant killed 8 persons and wounded 35. The wounded included 3 Los Angeles Times reporters and 3 local employees.

source: www.state.gov
Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State
March 2004

Terror (Bomb) in Indonesia

2007-06-10T02:42:00.000-07:00

Terror Bom di Indonesia (Beberapa di Luar Negeri) dari Waktu ke Waktu
sumber : tempointeraktif
Sabtu, 17 April 2004 | 06:35 WIB

Selama 1962-2003, Indonesia sudah mencatat puluhan kali ledakan bom terjadi dalam skala kecil dan besar, setengahnya terjadi di Jakarta. Catatan dimulai dengan ledakan bom yang terjadi di kompleks Perguruan Cikini dalam upaya pembunuhan presiden pertama RI, Ir Soekarno, pada 1962. Berikutnya,

11 November 1976: Di Masjid Nurul Iman, Padang. Pelakunya adalah Timzar Zubil, tokoh yang disebut pemerintah sebagai Komando Jihad. Tapi, Timzar tidak pernah ditemukan sampai sekarang.

20 Maret 1978: Sekelompok pemuda melakukan peledakan di beberapa tempat di Jakarta dengan bom molotov, dan membakar mobil presiden taksi untuk mengganggu jalannya sidang umum MPR.

14 April 1978: Masjid Istiqlal, Jakarta. Sampai sekarang, ledakan bom dengan bahan peledak TNT itu tetap jadi misterius.

4 Oktober 1984: Ledakan bom di BCA, Jalan Pecenongan, Jakarta Barat. Pelakunya adalah Muhammad Jayadi, anggota Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah (anak organisasi Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) lantaran protes terhadap peristiwa Tanjungpriok 1983. Jayadi yang tidak dikenal sebagai anggota Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah kemudian dijatuhi hukuman penjara 15 tahun setelah mengaku menjadi pelaku peledakan.

Saat bersamaan, juga terjadi ledakan di BCA dan Kompleks Pertokoan Glodok, Jakarta dengan pelaku Chairul Yunus alias Melta Halim, Tasrif Tuasikal, Hasnul Arifin yang juga merupakan anggota Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah. Mereka dijatuhi hukuman penjara dan dipecat dari keanggotaan Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah.

Selain itu, ledakan juga terjadi di BCA Jalan Gajah Mada, Jakarta Pusat dengan pelaku Edi Ramli, juga anggota Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah. Siapa dalang pemboman, sebenarnya masih misterius, tapi Edi dijatuhi hukuman penjara.

Rentetan kasus peledakan beberapa kantor BCA itu menyeret tokoh-tokoh Petisi 50, seperti H.M. Sanusi, A.M. Fatwa (keduanya dipenjara, saksi-saksi mengaku disiksa), dan H.R. Dharsono.

24 Desember 1984: Gedung Seminari Alkitab Asia Tenggara (SAAT), Jalan Margono, Malang, Jawa Timur. Tidak diketahui siapa pelakunya.

20 Januari 1985: Candi Borobudur di Jawa Tengah tak luput dari sasaran ledakan bom. Pelakunya adalah seorang mubalig, Husein Ali Alhabsy yang juga dilatar-belakangi motif protes terhadap peristiwa Tanjungpriok 1983. Husein menolak tuduhan atas keterlibatannya dalam peledakan Borobudur dan menuding Mohammad Jawad, yang tidak tertangkap, sebagai dalangnya. Pada awalnya, Husein mendapat ganjaran penjara seumur hidup. Tapi kemudian mendapatkan grasi dari pemerintahan Habibie pada 23 Maret 1999.

16 Maret 1985: Bus Pemudi Ekspress di Banyuwangi, Jawa Timur. Pelakunya adalah Abdulkadir Alhasby, anggota majelis taklim. Kasus ini juga dikaitkan dengan peledakan Candi Borobudur yang juga memprotes peristiwa Tanjungpriok 1983. Bahan peledak yang digunakan adalah TNT batangan PE 808/tipe Dahana.

14 Mei 1986: Terjadi hampir bersamaan di Wisma Metropolitan di Jalan Sudirman, di Hotel President di Jalan Thmarin dan di Pekan Raya Jakarta. "Brigade AntiImperialis Internasional“ di Jepang mengaku bertanggung jawab.

Juni 1986: Terjadi serangan roket ke Kedutaan Amerika, Jepang dan Kanada yang diluncurkan dari kamar 827 Presiden Hotel di Jalan MH. Thamrin.

13 September 1991: Ledakan bom di Mragen-Demak, Jawa Timur. Ketika itu, Xanana Gusmao sebagai pemimpin perjuangan Timor Leste menyatakan bertanggung jawab atas terjadinya ledakan yang diduga dilakukan oleh tiga pemuda Timor Leste.

30 September 1991: Hotel Mini Surabaya. Pelakunya tidak diketahui. Bahan peledak yang digunakan adalah potassium -biasa dipakai untuk membom ikan.

Februari 1993: Lantai dua gedung World Trade Center (WTC), New York, Amerika Serikat.

13 September 1997: Mranggen, Demak, Jawa Tengah yang dilakukan tiga pemuda Timor Timur dari kelompok prokemerdekaan Timor Timur. Bom meledak tidak sengaja. Tokoh Tim-tim Xanana Gusmao menyatakan bertanggung jawab atas peledakan itu. Tapi, tidak ada tersangka yang tertangkap.

18 Januari 1998: Rumah Susun Tanah Tinggi, Jakarta. Walau bom meledak tidak disengaja, Agus Priyono, anggota Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia untuk Demokrasi (SMID) -salah satu jaringan Partai Rakyat Demokrat-, dipenjara tujuh bulan lebih, karena dianggap mengetahui rencana pemboman tapi tidak melaporkannya ke pihak berwajib. Kasus ini sempat menyeret nama Sofjan dan Yusuf Wanandi serta Surya Paloh, yang semuanya membantah terlibat. Tapi, tidak ada dari tokoh itu yang diajukan ke pengadilan.

20 Februari 1998: Kampung Batik Sari, Semarang.

7 Agustus 1998: Kedutaan besar Amerika di Nairobi, Kenya dan di Darus Salam, Tanzania yang disinyalir dilakukan teroris yang punya hubungan dengan Al-Qaida dan Osama bin Laden. Peristiwa itu menewaskan 223 orang dan melukai 4.000 orang. Sebagian besar dari mereka yang terbunuh dan terluka dalam tiga pemboman itu adalah warga Kenya dan Tanzania.

11 Desember 1998: Atrium Plaza Senen, Jakarta. Pelaku tertangkap pada akhir 1999, sewaktu terjadi ledakan bom di Ramayana, Jalan Sabang. VM Rosalin Handayani dan Yan Pieterson Manusama disangka sebagai pelaku dengan motif usaha dagang. Bahan peledak berbau belerang.

2 Januari 1999: Toserba Ramayana, Jalan Sabang, Jakarta Pusat. Pelakunya adalah V.M. Rosalin Handayani dan Yan Pieterson Manusama, pengusaha yang dilatar-belakangi motif sengketa pribadi. Bahan peledak bom adalah TNT.

9 Februari 1999: Mal Kelapa Gading, Jakarta. Siapa pelaku dan apa motif bom yang berbahan peledak TNT itu, tidak diketahui.

15 April 1999: Plaza Hayam Wuruk, Jakarta Barat. Pelakunya adalah Ikhwan, Naiman, Edi Taufik, Suhendi, dan Edi Rohadi, anggota kelompok yang disebut-sebut sebagai Angkatan Mujahidin Islam Nusantara (AMIN) pimpinan Eddy Ranto. Motif pemboman adalah kriminal (perampokan). Kelompok AMIN ini juga dituduh meledakkan Istiqlal. Anehnya, dalam kasus ini, motifnya diputuskan sebagai kriminal. Bahan peledak ramuan KCl03 (kalium klorat) dan TNT.

19 April 1999: Masjid Istiqlal, Jakarta Pusat. Pelakunya adalah Eddy Ranto alias Umar, 40 tahun yang juga diduga sebagai otak perampokan Bank BCA Taman Sari, Jakarta dan peledakan satu wartel di kawasan Hayam Wuruk, Jakarta, beberapa pekan sebelumnya. Sayangnya, kasus ini tetap menjadi misterius, lantaran belum tuntas. Bahan peledaknya sama dengan kasus Hayam Wuruk. Bahan peledaknya, TNT (trinitrotoluene) dan KCLO3 (kalium chlorat).

Maret 2000: Depan Hotel Merdeka, Bekasi yang mengakibatkan dua orang luka-luka.

28 Mei 2000: Gereja Kristen Protestan Indonesia (GKPI) Medan. Siapa pelaku dan apa motifnya tetap jadi misterius.

29 Mei 2000: Gereja Katolik di Jalan Pemuda Medan. Siapa pelaku dan apa motifnya juga masih misterius.

1 Juli 2000: Di Jalan Imam Bonjol, KPU Jakarta. Kasus peledakan bom ini juga masih belum tuntas

4 Juli 2000: Di kamar kecil kantor Kejaksaan Agung, Jakarta. Siapa pelaku dan apa motif peledakan bom berkategori M-1 (Military One) buatan Pindad, itu masih misterius. Sampai sekarang, kasusnya belum terungkap jelas, padahal polisi sudah menyebar sketsa wajah yang diduga pelaku peledakan.

Agustus 2000: Kediaman Duta Besar Filipina untuk Indonesia, di Imam Bonjol, Jakarta. Ledakan bom itu menewaskan dua staf rumah tangga kediaman serta puluhan orang lainnya mengalami luka cukup serius. Bom yang dipakai adalah C-4 buatan Amerika Serikat. Pada 19 Oktober 2003, PN Jakarta Pusat menghukum Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai selama 20 tahun penjara. Abdul Jabar terbukti bersalah melakukan tindak pidana secara bersama-sama dengan Fatur Rahman Al- Ghozi dan Edi Setiono alias Usman, meledakkan bom di rumah Duta Besar Filipina itu. Dirinya juga dinyatakan terbukti bersalah turut serta melakukan aksi pemboman di sejumlah Gereja di Jakarta: Gereja Anglikan Menteng Jakarta Pusat dan Oikumene di Jalan Angkasa Halim Perdana Kusumah Jakarta Timur. Kedutaan besar Malaysia untuk Indonesia di Rasuna Said, Jakarta, juga mendapati ledakan bom. Tapi, tidak menimbulkan korban jiwa.

27 Agustus 2000: Di Medan, satu di bengkel di depan rumah penduduk di Jalan Bahagia, dan satu lagi di pagar rumah pendeta J. Sitorus.

September 2000: Bursa Efek Jakarta. Dengan bahan peledak TNT, ledakan bom menewaskan 10 orang, melukai puluhan orang dan merusakkan puluhan mobil. Pelakunya adalah Teungku Ismuhadi yang kemudian dihukum penjara 20 tahun.

13 September 2000: Ledakan dahsyat di lantai parkir P2 Gedung Bursa Efek Jakarta. Ledakan ini menelan korban 10 orang tewas, 15 orang luka, serta dua mobil hangus, 20 mobil rusak.

November 2000: Hotel Omni Batavia, Jakarta.

Desember 2000: Di berbagai tempat di Indonesia saat malam Natal: Jakarta, Bekasi, Sukabumi, Bandung, Mojokerto, Mataram, Pematang Siantar, Medan, Batam, dan Pekanbaru, yang mengakibatkan belasan orang tewas, seratus lebih lainnya luka-luka dan puluhan mobil rusak. Tercatat hanya 16 dari 31 bom yang meledak. Bahan peledaknya, TNT yang ditambahkan supreme seal pot dengan wadah plastik ungu dan diisi 100 gotri.

Januari 2001: Bom rakitan di satu mobil di Pasar Minggu, Jakarta. Selain itu, Taman Mini Indonesia Indah juga sempat digegerkan ledakan bom yang dilakukan Elize M. Tuwahatu.

Maret 2001: Rumah Sakit Saint Carolus, Jakarta. Sementara itu, ledakan bom juga terjadi di jembatan kereta api Cisadane, Serpong, Tangerang.

April 2001: Di Jalan Percetakan Negara, Jakarta.

10 Mei 2001: Di bangunan Yayasan Kesejahteraan Mahasiswa Iskandar Muda, di Jalan Guntur, Jakarta Selatan. Tiga orang tewas, sebagian bangunan hancur.

Juni 2001: Di kamar kos di kawasan Pancoran, Jakarta. Berselang hanya dua pekan, di Cikoko, di kawasan Pancoran juga, ledakan bom kembali terjadi.

Juli 2001: Gereja Santa Anna, Pondok Bambu, Jakarta. Ledakan mencederai puluhan orang. Hanya sehari berselang, ledakan bom kembali terjadi di Jalan Semarang, Menteng, Jakarta, dan melukai satu orang.

Agustus 2001: Plaza Atrium, Senen, Jakarta. Ledakan melukai enam orang. Kedua pelaku peledakan, Edi Setyono alias Abbas dan Taufik bin Abdul Halim dihukum hukuman mati oleh PN Jakarta Pusat.

September 2001: Gedung kembar WTC, New York, Amerika Serikat. Satu jet komersial menabrak menara utara bangunan 110 lantai antara lantai 80 dan 85. Selang beberapa menit, satu pesawat komersial lainnya menabrak menara selatan. Diperkirakan, tiga ribu orang tewas dan 1.000 cedera dalam peristiwa itu. Sebanyak 40.000 orang bekerja di pusat perdagangan dua gedung itu; lebih dari 150.000 orang memasuki kompleks itu setiap hari untuk berbisnis atau hanya jalan-jalan. Dari Dubai, Uni Emirat Arab, dilaporkan, satu kelompok Palestina menyatakan bertanggung jawab atas serangan pesawat terhadap WTC itu. Televisi Abu Dhabi melaporkan, pihaknya telah menerima telepon dari Front Demokratis bagi Pembebasan Palestina (DFLP) di luar negeri -yang menyatakan bertanggung jawab. Gedung yang diserang itu merupakan institusi internasional yang melambangkan kemakmuran ekonomi dunia. Di sana terdapat perwakilan dari pemerintah Thailand, Cile, dan Pantai Gading, misalnya. Di WTC terdapat 430 perusahaan dari 28 negara.

Serangan bom pesawat juga terjadi terhadap Pentagon, Washington dan menewaskan 189 orang, termasuk para penumpang pesawat. Sementara itu, 45 orang tewas dalam pesawat keempat yang jatuh di daerah pedalaman Pennsylvania.

23 September 2001: Lantai parkir Atrium Plaza, Senen. Ledakan menghancurkan beberapa mobil, walau tidak ada korban jiwa.

2001: Asrama haji Sudiang, Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan.

2002: Restoran Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) dan restoran McDonald’s di Sulawesi Selatan.

1 Januari 2002: Di depan rumah makan ayam Bulungan, Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta Selatan. Seorang pelaku, Hasballah tewas seketika di tempat kejadian. Bahan peledak yang digunakan yang digunakan adalah granat manggis K75 buatan Korea.

18 Januari 2002: Gardu PLN di depan bekas terminal Cililitan, Jakarta Timur. Sementara itu, di Palu, satu ledakan juga mengguncang tiga rumah ibadah. Gereja Masehi Advent Hari Ketujuh, Gereja Pantekosta di Indonesia dan Gereja Kristen Indonesia Sulawesi Selatan Jemaat Palu rusak akibat bom rakitan.

20 Januari 2002: Fathurrahman al Ghozi, seorang Warga Negara Indonesia, ditangkap oleh pihak keamanan Filipina. Lelaki kelahiran Madiun dituduh terlibat dalam pengeboman sebuah stasiun kereta api di pusat kota Manila di malam Tahun Baru 2002. Filipina menyatakan, al Ghozi sebagai salah satu anggota sel al Qaidah di Asia Tenggara.

Maret 2002: Kantor Babinkum, Pulo Gebang, Jakarta.

Juni 2002: Di depan gedung konsulat jenderal Amerika Serikat di Karachi, Pakistan yang mengakibatkan delapan orang tewas.

9 Juni 2002: Di lahan parkir Hotel Jayakarta dan Diskotik Eksotis, Kota, Jakarta Barat. Pelakunya, Dodi Prayoko berhasil ditangkap polisi.

1 Juli 2002: Mal Graha Cijantung, Jakarta. Tujuh orang luka-luka dan tidak ada korban jiwa akibat ledakan itu. Polisi menangkap lima tersangka yang diyakini terkait dengan Gerakan Aceh Merdeka yakni, Ramli. M. Nur, Mudawali, Muhamad Hasan Irsyadi dan Syahrul. Bom rakitan jenis low explosive itu terdiri dari campuran belerang, alumunium powder, potasium klorat, baterai, dan serpihan besi atau paku.

Oktober 2002: Bandung Supermall dan Istana Plaza, Bandung.

12 Oktober 2002: Tiga ledakan bom mengguncang Bali. Ledakan pertama dan kedua mengguncang kawasan di Jalan Legian, Kuta. Sedangkan ledakan lainnya terjadi di dekat kantor konsulat AS, Denpasar. Di Manado, Sulawesi Utara, bom rakitan meledak di pintu gerbang masuk kantor Konjen Filipina. Tidak ada korban jiwa.

Ledakan di Jalan Legian, mengakibatkan setidaknya 187 tewas dan 400-an lainnya luka-luka. Ledakan juga mengakibatkan kerusakan parah dalam radius 100 meter dari pusat ledakan. Polisi mengidentifikasikan bahwa ledakan berasal dari bom mobil yang diletakkan dalam Mitsubishi L300.

Sebagai peracik bahan-bahan kimia bahan peledak, Sarjiyo alias Sawad, dihukum seumur hidup oleh majelis hakim PN Denpasar yang juga menghukum Saad alias Mat Ucang 20 tahun penjara lantaran menyembunyikan Mukhlas alias Ali Gufron saat dalam pelarian. Hernianto dihukum 12 tahun penjara. Selain itu, kelompok Kalimantan, seperti Mubarok dihukum seumur hidup, Sukastopo tiga tahun, Imam Susanto empat tahun delapan bulan, Mujarot lima tahun, Hamzah Baya enam tahun, Eko Hadi P empat tahun enam bulan, Puriyanto empat tahun enam bulan, Firmansyah empat tahun, Syamsul Arifin tiga tahun penjara, Sofyan Hadi enam tahun, Sirojul Munir lima tahun, Sukastopo tiga tahun, Muhammad Yunus enam tahun.

Sementara itu, Ali Imron alias Ale -adik kandung Amrozi, dihukum seumur hidup. Imam Samudra dihukum hukuman mati lantaran secara bersama-sama dengan anggota kelompoknya melakukan aksi pemboman itu; secara bersama-sama menyiapkan dana untuk membiayai bom Bali. Ini berkaitan dengan perampokan toko emas 'Elita' di Serang, Banten, yang dananya digunakan untuk biaya bom Bali. Diantaranya, Rp. 20 juta yang diberikan kepada Amrozi untuk membeli bahan-bahan peledak, serta tambahan biaya membeli mobil Mitsubishi L-300; aktifitasnya sebagai tokoh penting dalam kasus bom Malam Natal di empat gereja di Batam 24 Desember 2000: Gereja Pante Kosta Pelita, Gereja GKPS Sei Panas, Gereja Betani May Mart, serta Gereja Beato Damian, di kawasan Bengkong Green; secara bersama-sama dan bersekutu atau masing-masing bertindak untuk dirinya sendiri dengan sengaja membakar atau menjadikan letusan yang dapat mendatangkan bahaya umum bagi barang. Dalam peristiwa bom Batam, selain merusak gereja, juga menimbulkan korban manusia, 26 luka berat, serta 3 orang luka ringan

Di Manado, pada saat yang hampir bersamaan juga terjadi ledakan di depan kantor konsulat Filipina di Jalan Tikala. Pada peristiwa yang tidak menelan korban jiwa itu, polisi menangkap dua pelaku pemboman: Otje dan Idris.

5 Desember 2002: Mal Ratu Indah Makassar pada malam Idul Fitri. Tiga orang tewas dalam peristiwa itu. Enam belas orang ditetapkan sebagai tersangka, diantaranya, Agung Abdul Hamid, Mukhtar Daeng Lau, Usman, Masnur, Azhar Daeng Salam, Ilham, Hizbullah Rasyid, Dahlan, Lukman, Suryadi, Abdul Hamid, Iwal, Mirzal, Itang, Khaerul, dan Kahar Mustafa. Dua belas orang telah berhasil ditangkap polisi, empat orang lainnya yang masih buron adalah Agung Abdul Hamid, Dahlan, Mirzal dan Hizbullah Rasyid.

Januari 2003: Pangkalan bajaj di Jalan Jembatan Besi Raya Gang I, Tambora, Jakarta. Ledakan berasal dari bom Molotov yang dilemparkan ke pangkalan bajaj yang mengakibatkan sebuah bajaj terbakar. Bom itu terbuat dari botol bir isi bensin dan sumbu. Tak ada korban jiwa dalam peristiwa itu. Sementara itu, ledakan bom rakitan terjadi dan mengenai dua polisi di jembatan besi Jorong Silawai, Kecamatan Airbangis, Kabupaten Pasaman, Sumatra Barat.

14 Januari 2003 : Ambon.

3 Februari 2003: Wisma Bhayangkari Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia. Ledakan berasal dari sebuah bom rakitan yang dibuat dari pipa paralon sepanjang 11 cm dengan diameter 16 cm, ditutup dengan lempengan baja yang dilapisi dengan semen. Walau berkekuatan rendah, ledakan merusakan satu mobil dan menghancurkan bagian bagunan yang ada di Wisma Bhayangkari. Polisi menangkap tersangka pelaku pemboman, Ajun Komisaris Polisi Anang Sumpena. Tidak ada korban jiwa akibat ledakan itu.

1 April 2003: Bom mengguncang Medan. Kali ini terjadi lagi di jalur pipa milik PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (PGN). Diperkirakan bom meledak pukul 03.00 WIB. Tak ada korban jiwa.

24 April 2003: Di jembatan Kali Cideng, belakang kantor Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa. Sasaran kemungkinan ditujukan ke kantor PBB. Bom rakitan itu terbuat dari besi yang panjangnya sekitar 33 sentimeter, dengan diameter sekitar 10 sentimeter, dan ketebalan pipanya sekitar 6,6 milimeter. Ledakan berkekuatan rendah. Tidak ada korban.

27 April 2003: Terminal 2 Bandara Soekarno-Hatta. Saat itu, tujuh orang yang merupakan satu keluarga menjadi korban ledakan. Lima di antaranya dirawat di Rumah Sakit Pantai Indah Kapuk PIK dan dua lainnya dirawat di RSU Tangerang. Ledakan berkekuatan rendah. Belum diketahui penyebab dan motif ledakan.

30 Juni 2003 : Di Pasar Aceh, Kota Banda Aceh. Sementara itu, satu bom lainnya dapat dijinakkan di satu rumah sakit umum Kota Banda Aceh. Tiga pedagang menderita luka terkena serpihan bom.

14 Juli 2003: Gedung Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat. Tidak ada korban jiwa.

10 Juli 2003: Pasar Koronadal, Filipina Selatan. Ledakan menewaskan tiga orang serta mencederai setidaknya 29 orang.

Juli 2003: Saat konser musik terbuka di Moskow, Rusia. Bom bunuh diri itu menewaskan 14 orang serta puluhan terluka.

5 Agustus 2003: Hotel JW Marriott, Jakarta. Dengan bahan peledak, antar lain berupa CLO3, Almunium Fowder, TNT, Detanator dan Detonating Cord (sumbu peledak), bom menewaskan 13 orang, melukai 74 orang dan menghancurkan 22 mobil.

Menurut keterangan tersangka Amran Bin Mansur alias Andi Saputra, bahan peledak bom menggunakan sisa-sisa bom Malam Natal 2000 yang diselundupkan dari Fillipina Selatan sebelum 2000. Amran, pria kelahiran Pontian Johor Malaysia, merupakan anggota Jamaah Islamiyah yang berperan sebagai penyedia bahan peledak bom Malam Natal 2000. Amran mendistribusikan bahan peledak ke empat tempat pengeboman: gereja-gereja di Batam, Pekan Baru (Sumatera), Jawa dan Nusa Tenggara Timur.

Perintah tertinggi pengeboman Malam Natal itu ada di tangan Hambali alias Encep Nurjaman, pria Cianjur Jawa Barat yang ditangkap di Ayutthaha Thailand, 2003, oleh aparat intelijen Thailand. Hambali kemudian menunjuk penanggung-jawab eksekusi di empat tempat itu, dua di antaranya, Imam Samudera alias Kudama untuk Batam dan Idris alias Gembrot untuk Pekanbaru. Kepada para penanggung-jawab itulah, Amran menyerahkan bahan peledak. Selain bom, Amran juga menyerahkan enam senjata jenis revolver asal Malaysia: tiga untuk Batam dan tiga untuk Pekanbaru. Selepas itu, Amran kabur ke Malaysia, tapi kembali lagi ke Indonesia pada 2001. Lewat jalur ilegal, Amran dua kali keluar-masuk: Batam, Johor Malaysia, Nunukan Kalimantan Timur dan Manado, Sulawesi Utara.

Selain Amran, ada penyedia dana bernama Jabfar -juga warga Malaysia- yang berhasil ditangkap tim anti teror Mabes Polri di Desa Grinsing, Batang, Jawa Tengah, 5 Februari 2004. Jabfar inilah yang menuntun aparat untuk menangkap Amran.

Baik Amran maupun Jabfar sudah aktif dalam pengeboman di Indonesia sejak 1999. Tapi pada 2001, mereka sudah tidak aktif lagi. Jabfar adalah pengikut Pondok Pesantren Lukmanul Hakim milik Amir Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Ustadz Abu Bakar Baasyir di Malaysia yang sudah dibubarkan. Amran dan Jabfar juga bekerja-sama dalam pengeboman Malam Natal 2000. Tapi selepas tugas, mereka berpisah dan kabur.

Terbukti terlibat dalam persiapan aksi pengeboman Hotel JW Marriott, Sardona Siliwangi bin Azwar, 23 tahun, dihukum sepuluh tahun penjara oleh majelis hakim PN Bengkulu. Sardona sendiri saat ini adalah mahasiwa semester satu Akademi Komputer swasta di Kota Bengkulu. Diperkirakan, sekitar 4 Januari hingga pelaksanaan pengeboman di Hotel JW Marriott 5 Agustus 2003, dirinya ikut bersama-sama menyimpan bahan peledak yang dibungkus enam kardus di kediamannya di Jalan Gedang Kilometer 6,5, Rt.1-Rw.01, nomor 43, Kecamatan Gading Cempaka, Bengkulu. Perbuatan terdakwa dilakukan bersama-sama dengan Asmar Latin Sani (pelaku bom bunuh diri), Noor Din Moh Top alias Isa, Dr. Azhari alias bahar, Moh. Rais alias Indra alias Iskandar alias Ryan Arifin, Toni Togar alias Indra Warman dan Mohammad Ihsan alias Idris alias Joni Hendrawan alias Gembrot alias Jo.

7 Agustus 2003: Di Kabupaten Poso, Sulawesi Tengah. Akibat ledakkan, Bachtiar alias Manto, 20 tahun, yang diduga kuat sebagai perakit bom itu tewas.

12 September 2003: Di daerah konflik Poso, Sulawesi Tengah. Ledakan bom mengakibatkan lima warga luka-luka.

8 November 2003: Bom mobil meledak dalam komplek ekspatriat Arab di Riyadh, Arab Saudi, menewaskan 17 orang dan 120 warga lainnya luka-luka.

15 November 2003: Di luar sinagoga di Istanbul, Turki, yang penuh terisi orang. Bom mobil menyebabkan 20 orang tewas dan 300 lainnya terluka.

20 November 2003: Istanbul, Turki. Bom bunuh diri menewaskan 27 orang dan 450 lainnya cedera.

5 Desember 2003: Di dekat perbatasan Rusia-Chechnya. Bom bunuh diri meledakkan kereta api, menewaskan 36 orang dan sekitar 150 orang lainnya cedera.

5 Desember 2003: Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan. Muhammad Tang alias Ittang (30) yang telah membantu pelarian otak bom Makassar, Agung Hamid, dihukum tujuh tahun penjara oleh PN Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan yang juga menghukum Suryadi Mas'ud (31) delapan tahun penjara. Selain itu, Khaerul alias Herul alias Mato (23) dihukum tujuh tahun penjara, Kaharuddin Mustafa lima tahun penjara lantaran ikut membantu dan memberikan kemudahan kepada tersanga Agung Hamid yang disebut-sebut sebagai otak peledakan. Imal Hamid, 35 tahun, dihukum enam tahun penjara lantaran menyembunyikan informasi pelaku tindak pidana terorisme, yaitu sudah tahu adanya bahan peledak berupa dua karung photasium dan satu karung TNT yang disimpan Agung Hamid (buron) di rumahnya, di Desa Garessi, Kecamatan Tanete Rilau, Kabupaten Barru. Suriadi SPd, 32 tahun, dihukum tujuh tahun penjara.

9 Desember 2003: Di dekat gedung parlemen Rusia di Moskow. Akibat bom bunuh diri itu, belasan orang luka berat. Dua wanita pelaku pemboman ditemukan tewas.

Januari 2004: Di Medan, Sumatera Utara. Pelakunya adalah penjual mie Aceh dan anggota separatis Gerakan Aceh Merdeka: Sfd Bin Slm alias Fudin (30) dan AS alias Mamad (24), penduduk Samlantira dan Kecamatan Tanah, Aceh Utara.

Sementara itu, bom juga meledak di Kafe Samfodo Indah di Kota Palopo, Sulawesi Selatan dan mengakibatkan empat tewas dan dua orang lagi mengalami luka-luka. Pelakunya, Arman, Idil, Ahmad Rizal, Jeddi, Benardi dan Jasmin. Enam orang lainnya yang masih buron adalah Aswandi alias Aco bin Kasim, Ishak, Nirwan, Kahar dan Agung Hamid. Disinyalir, Agung Hamid juga tokoh utama peledakan bom di Mal Ratu Indah Makassar, 5 Desember 2002.

11 Maret 2004: Madrid, Spanyol. Ledakan bom menewaskan 200 orang. Tersangkanya, tiga warga Maroko dan dua asal India ditangkap, dan diyakini terkait dengan jaringan penjualan dan pemalsuan telepon seluler dan SIM Card. “Kemungkinan, kelima tersangka memiliki hubungan dengan kelompok radikal di Maroko,” kata Menteri Dalam Negeri Spanyol, Angel Acebes.

21 Maret 2004: Rumah milik nyonya Sugeng di Jalan Bhakti Abri Kampung Sindangrasa, Kelurahan Sukamaju, Kecamatan Cimanggis Depok. Ledakan bom rakitan itu tidak memakan korban jiwa dan kerusakan berarti.

Levi Silalahi, Erwin Prima, TNR dan Berbagai Sumber